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"When the senior statesmen of the Allied and
Associated Powers met ... to shape the peace that
was supposed to justify all the slaughter and
misery of the long war, it was expected that the
result of their labors would be the creation,
not just of a peace in Europe, but of something
resembling a new world order.
"
l
The United States and its Western European allies should
exercise caution and restraint with regard to formal
integration of East Central Europe within the common security
institutions of the West. Many analysts argue otherwise: that
the collapse of Soviet Power has provided a unique opportunity
to integrate formerly closed societies into the Western
system, to move beyond the process of containment so central
to previous security calculations, and to, in effect, roll
back Russian power and potential future influence in East
Central Europe to a degree unimagined by the most ardent Cold
Warriors. These analysts would further argue that such a
unique opportunity can be fulfilled only, through strong
integration with the common institutions of the West; that any
other course would discourage political and economic progress
in East Central Europe, promote regional instability, and pave
George F. Kennan describing Che atmosphere surrounding Che Paris Peace
Conference in 1918, in Russia and cne Wesc Undet Lenin and Staim , (New York:
Mew American Library, 1960), llh .
the way for a return of Russian influence should Russia fail
to progress sufficiently from the bitter ashes of her past.^
It is the project of this thesis to prove this quite
popular view in favor of formal integration wrong, and to
argue that the process of integration should be limited to
informal or symbolic measures which encourage economic and
political development, but which retain East Central Europe as
a buffer between Western Europe and the Commonwealth of
Independent States. Throughout this century, East Central
Europe has provided its services as such a buffer, first on
behalf of the United States and Western Europe, and then on
behalf of the Soviet Union. Despite the most optimistic
wishes, the burden of this at times difficult history is
inescapable, can be neither discarded nor ignored, and must be
factored into any future regional security calculation.
What follows is an acknowledgement of international change
tempered by an abiding belief in the power of historical
continuity. Writing on the subject of the power of history in
the face of an accelerating social dynamic, historian Arthur
M. Schlesinger, Jr., noted that:
"For example, in an article about revamping the Atlantic Alliance,
Henry Kissinger remarked that, "no issue is more urgent than to relate the
former Soviet satellites of Eastern Europe to Western Europe and NAT<>. At
least Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary should be permitted to join the
Community rapidly. It is hardly to the credit of the West that after talking
for a generation about freedom for Eastern Europe, so little is done to
vindicate it. Moreover, if a no-man' s- land is to be avoided in Eastern
Europe, NATo ought to leave no doubt that pressures against these countries
would be treated ^s a challenge to Western security, whatever the formal
aspect of this undertaking." Henry Kissinger, "The Atlantic Alliance Needs
Renewal in a Changed WorLd," The Internet ional Herald Tribune , 2 March 1992,
The law of acceleration hurtles us into the inscrutable
future. But it cannot wipe the slate of the past.
History haunts even generations who refuse to learn
history. Rhythms, patterns, continuities, drift out of
time long forgotten to mold the present and to color the
shape of things to come. Science and technology
revolutionize our lives, but memory, tradition, and myth
frame our response. Expelled from individual
consciousness by the rush of change, history finds its
revenge by stamping the collective unconscious with
habits, values, expectations, dreams. The dialectic
between past and future will continue to form our lives. 3
Nowhere does the dialectic between the 'slate of the past' and
the 'inscrutable future' become more clearly important than in
the fashioning of a New World Order - an idea ill-defined,
fuzzy, and poorly understood by commentators and policy makers
alike. 4
This thesis is a reconciliation of that dialectic in the
application of the New World Order to what was once considered
Eastern Europe, but which is more properly called East Central
Europe. The first question then is how such a reconciliation
can be accomplished. In his seminal work, The Rise and Fall
of the Great Powers , historian Paul Kennedy argues that the
United States is in decline as a Great Power, primarily
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Cvclea of American History , (Boston;
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1986), xii.
Perhaps a more practical expression of Schlesinger ' s idea is that, "we
are used to saying that everything is moving along much faster than it used
to, in communication, in the development of science. Yet the international
system had, before the tumultuous events of the fall of 1989, been standing
remarkably still since the end of World II, in terms of alliance structures;
in terms of boundaries; in the absence of major wars ... Our conscious
assessments of what is happening have probably insufficiently juxtaposed this
acceleration of science and the deceleration of international realignments."
George H. Quester, "Knowing and Believing about Nuclear Proliferation,'"
Security Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2, Winter 1991, 280.
because the costs of maintaining a military structure
consistent with Great Power commitments have outstripped the
benefits that those commitments bring to the American economy
as a whole. A strategic climate of rising costs is met by a
receding economic ability to pay those costs. 5
The reason why Kennedy considers this negative cost to
benefit ratio as evidence of American decline is that a
similar ratio, arrived at by a similar train of circumstances,
has been central to the decline of almost every Great Power of
the preceding five-hundred years. 6 In other words, the
independent variables associated with imperial overstretch
(economic costs versus economic benefits) have in almost every
case yielded a consistent outcome variable involving Great
Power status. Although other factors were also present 7
,
Kennedy concludes that, "it is precisely because the power
position of the leading nations has closely paralleled their
relative economic position over the past five centuries that
JThe actual phrase that Kennedy uses is for the point at which costs
overtake benefits is the point of 'imperial overstretch'. Before that point,
military power advances the economic- position and Great Power status of
specific states; after the .point of imperial overstretch, military power
reverses the process. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers:
Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 , (Mew York: Random
House, 1987), xv-xxv.
bKennedy includes in his study the Hapsburg Empire of the 16th and 17th
centuries, the Anglo-Dutch wars of the 18th century, the dynastic wars of the
18th century, the Napoleonic era, the . Pax Britannia and the era of 19th
century European imperial expansion, Imperial Russia in the 19th century, and
che United States in the 20th century.
for example, "geography, military organization, national moral, the
alliance system, and many other factors." Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the
Great Powers, xx i v
.
it seems worthwhile asking what the implications of today's
economic and technological trends might be for the current
balance of power." 8
Without speculating on conclusions regarding American
decline, this thesis borrows heavily from Kennedy's
methodology in the application of the New World Order to the
security problems of East Central Europe in the post-Cold War
world, albeit with a more limited scope and a different list
of comparative variables.'3 The central puzzle concerns the
role, prospects and future of East Central Europe within a
Western-dominated, post Cold War security arrangement
specifically by examining the East Central European role in
past arrangements, and by applying the resulting model to
current conditions. Do current circumstances indicate a
future in continuity with the past? If so, to what degree
Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers , xxiv.
• ''Any model based on historical analogy runs certain risks. The first
involves the problem of choosing appropriate precedents, a problem compounded
by two factors: accurate discernment of a pattern within each precedent, and
precise matching of the pattern amongst the selected historical cases. The
second risk involves the problems of generalization and assumption - two
techniques necessary in the search for analogy and pattern. Although this
thesis draws much of its inspiration from Paul Kennedy's Rise and Fall of the
Great Powers
, it owes more in terms of practical guidance to Richard E.
Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for
Decision Makers
,
(New York: The Free Press, 1986) which provides a complete
text of the problems involved and the techniques needed. Particularly useful
are chapter 3: "Unreasoning from Analogies," 34-57, chapter 5: "Dodging
Bothersome Analogies," 75-90, chapter 1 : "Finding History that Fits," 111-
134, chapter 11: "Noticing Patterns," 196-211, and chapter 14: "Seeing Time
as a Stream," 247-270. will and Ariel Durant's The Story of Civilization
interestingly illustrates che problem. Aftei eleven volumes ,>vering roughly
nine-thousand pages of text, the authors produced a final volume, The Lessons
of History (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968), of one-hundred and two
pages .
will current policy proscriptions conspire to remove East
Central Europe from previous security constraints?
Within a security context, East Central Europe has
survived three distinct phases since its inception (each phase
defined by the alternating hegemonic status over security
arrangements of either Russia or a particular country or group
of countries within the West)
.
10 The first phase began with
the birth of East Central Europe - assured by Western support
amidst imperial ruin and Bolshevik generation in 1919 - and
ended with the Soviet occupation in 1945. The second phase
began with the cementing of Soviet hegemony in the late 1940s,
and ended only with the revolutions in 1989. The third phase
began in 1989 with the reestablishment of nominally democratic
regimes - again apparently dependent on Western support - and
will undoubtedly end at some undetermined time in the future.
In each of the first two phases, almost identical
strategic assessments of threat dictated that East Central
Europe exist as a buffer on behalf of the hegemonic power,
despite the fact that the political context and political
personalities behind those assessments were markedly
different. To paraphrase Kennedy, it seems worthwhile asking
what the implications of today's threats to the West might be
' JThe issue of what constitutes hegemony is complex., and popular
let initions are by no means universal. Subsequent sections will give a
rlearer working definition.
for the current role of East Central Europe within a Western
dictated security system. The answer (and certainly the main
argument of this thesis) might be that current threats demand
a consistent role for East Central Europe as buffer between
East and West
.
What would prevent such continuity? In the first place,
perhaps nowhere was the acceleration of change more eagerly
anticipated than in the closed societies of Eastern Europe; no
region was promised more benefit from the end of the Cold War;
nowhere has policy been driven more by the ideology of
progress and hope. This promise was stated effectively by
Dwight Eisenhower:
The American conscience can never know peace until these
(enslaved) people are restored again to being masters of
their own fate. Never shall we desist in our aid to every
man and woman of those shackled lands who is dedicated to
the liberation of his fellows. 11
This promise to East Central Europe was heady stuff indeed,
and implied - absent Soviet power - spiritual, political,
economic, and military integration with the ideals and common
institutions of the West; 1 ' a common dream suggested a common
destiny. As noted by Secretary of State .James A. Baker III,
the promise, that "we (the West) will welcome into the
uRemark made during che first Presidential campaign, August 1952.
Donald Neff, Warriors at Suez, Eisenhower Takes America into the Middle East
,
'Mew York: The Linden Press/Simon and Schuster, 1981), 351.
"Remembei ing of course that when Eisenhowei made this statement, the
process of integration so recognizable now In Western Europe had barely
begun .
community of democratic nations those new political entities
who believe in democratic values and follow democratic
practices," has not been diluted with time. 1;)
What results is a competition between those factors - such
as the ideological bias cited above - which would encourage
acceleration into Schlesinger ' s inscrutable future, and those
factors (cited in the bulk of this study) which would
encourage consistency with policies of the past. This
competition involves a number of central elements:
1. limits, definitions, theory, and hypothesis;
2
.
the birth of East Central Europe within the context of
the long-term struggle between Soviet Russia and the
industrial West;
3 the circumstances surrounding the creation of the first
and second phases in 1919 and 1945 respectively;
4. the explanations for the destruction of the first and
second phases;
5. analysis, based on the developed model, of the present
role of East Central Europe within an evolving, Western-
dominated, post -Cold War arrangement,
6. and finally, investigation of the future role and
security prospects of East Central Europe with respect to
this previous analysis.
To what degree will internationa-1 change - the application of
the New World Order to East Central Europe - be tempered by
the power of historical continuity?
1
'Secretary of State James A. Baker III, "American and the collapse of
the Soviet Empire: What Has to Be Done," from a speech at Princeton
University, 12 December 1991, printed by the n.s. Department of state, office
of the Assistant Secretary /Spokesman, 10.
One final thought before proceeding: Karl Jaspers once
wrote that, "We find genuine tragedy ... only in that
destruction which does not prematurely cut short development
and success, but which, instead, grows out of success
itself." 14 Victory in the Cold War was a success beyond
measure; will success allow a tragedy that is its equal?
Karl Jaspers, Tragedy is nor Enough
,
quote in William Appleman
Williams, The Tragedy of American Dioloiiu-P-y
,
(New York: Delta Books, 1959),
II. EAST CENTRAL EUROPE, SECURITY ARCHITECTURE, AND
THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
"I feel strongly the time has arrived for you again to
reassert your spiritual leadership of democracy in the
world as opposed to tyrannies of all kinds. " IS
"The very ideas that stirred Jefferson and Montesquieu
resonate today in the words of Havel and Geremek. They
echo in our collective historical memory, and they
illuminate our path to the future. " lb
The purpose of the first chapter is to establish the
relationship between East Central Europe, current discussions
on post-Cold War security architecture in the New World Order,
and the relevance of historical analysis on those current
discussions. After establishing the central methodological
assertion of the thesis as a whole, that such a relationship
can be made, the first chapter further indicates how
historical analysis is used in this study to illuminate the
current security environment, and, in broad terms, what such
illumination might indicate for the subsequent prospects of
East Central Europe. Establishing the central relationship
1 c
Letter from Herbert Hoover to Woodrow Wilson concerning the Nansen
Plan for humanitarian aid to Europe. Arno J. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy
of Peacemaking - Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1913-1919
,
(New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1967), 27.
°From Secretary of State James A. Baker's remarks before n he Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Conference on the Human Dimension,
Copenhagen, June 6, 1990. James A. Baker, "CSCE: The Conscience of the
Continent," Current Policy , Mo. 1230, (Washington D.C.: Hnited States
Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, 1990), 1.
10
between East Central Europe, post-Cold War security
architecture, and historical analysis involves investigation
of four central elements: the advantages of historical review
over other methods of analysis, the scope and definitions
which confine historical review in this study to proportions
which are both manageable and which provide the clearest
insights, the factors which confirm the utility of a regional
perspective at a time when' the traditional alliance structure
in East Central Europe has disintegrated, the analytical
constructs and conceptual foundations central to the
methodology upon which the relationship between past events
and current security discussions is based, and the
hypothetical conclusions towards which the historical analysis
in this study will progress.
A. THE ACTIONS OF DEAD MEN
Concerning the post-Cold War security prospects of East
Central Europe, why base analysis on a sort of anecdotal
survey of diplomatic history? Surely political science has
progressed beyond such a crude tool for understanding future
events - has streamlined the historical review into a concise
set of theories, rigorously tested and validated, which remove
from the analyst the necessity of contact with the messy,
confusing, often unrelated, and even more often contradictory
details which so frequently characterize the narrative
recounting of past circumstances. Why not say that the causes
11
of a certain policy were simply the inevitable outcome of a
theoretically circumscribed world (a world defined by
International Relations theory, structural realism, game
theory, Great Power theory, deterrence theory, etc.), and
avoid entirely the unique qualities of the specific diplomatic
policy under discussion? Is not the recounting of already
known historical events the political science equivalent of
reinventing the wheel? Even if historical analysis proves
pertinent and interesting, does any sort of mechanism protrude
from the past to impinge upon the conduct of current and
future events?
In the absence of a clear blueprint for political action
(such as that provided by the Soviet threat to the industrial
West), historical anecdote is used to a remarkable degree to
justify specific policies. Past triumphs, and especially past
mistakes, have been used since the end of the Cold War to sell
a variety of security initiatives not readily justifiable by
means other than historical reference. Examples of such
justifications include the speech by Secretary of State James
A. Baker to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe in which the continued human rights orientation of that
organization is ordained and mandated by the "collective
historical memory (of) the very ideas that so stirred
Jefferson and Montesquieu." 17
James A. Baker, "CSCE: The Conscience of the Continent:," l
12
In testimony before Congress by General John R. Galvin,
continued American troop presence in Europe is supported by
the record of "the first half of this century, (when)
conflicts and instability in Europe caused (the United States)
to send hundreds of thousands of American troops to fight in
two bloody wars in order to restore peace." 18 The costs of
American retreat from European involvement were strongly
framed by historical anecdote by President Bush in his press
conference at the NATO Summit in Rome:
One can't predict with totality where . . . events will lead
us. ... History shows that we have a stake in a peaceful
Europe. ... we are going to be able to participate fully
... I'd say to the isolationists in the United States:
Look at your history. Don't pull back into some fortress
America. " 19
The degree to which historical experience actually
influences the decision making process of political leadership
is difficult to know.
,
The degree to which political
leadership uses precedent and tradition to sell policy,
Statement of General John R. Galvin, Commander in Chief, U.S. European
Command, before the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services on March
3, 1992, p. 2.
President Bush, "The President's News conference in Rome, Italy,
November 3, 1991, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents , Monday,
November 11, 1991 vol 7, No. 45, pp. 1575-1615, 1607. Other examples
include a statement by Secretary Baker in which the costs of failure to
adequately support the revolutions of 1989 are compared those costs endured
by the West after "the :ollapse jt the promising democratic revolution in
Petrograd in February 1917." James A. Baker, "America and the Collapse of
the Soviet Empire: What has to be Done," 2. Testimony before Congress by
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney concerning the 1993 Defense Budget quoted
President Bush 3ii the issue of cutbacks: "This deep and no deeper. t : I
less would be insensible to progress, but to do more would be ignorant of
history." "Statement of the Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney before the
Senate Armed Services Committee in Connection with the FY 1993 Budget for the
Department of Defense, January 31, 1992," 6.
13
however, appears to be high indeed. Historical references (no
matter how inaccurate) are perceived as factual references;
historical personalities are real people; historical events
really happened. The fact that history is used to justify so
much, demands an analysis which uses history well, even if
that analysis does no more than to dispel the historical
foundations of specific policy justifications.
Nowhere is this need to either confirm or dispel allusions
to historical precedent more evident than in discussions of
what should be done with the post-Cold War states of East
Central Europe. An analyst reflecting on the political
environment of East Central Europe between the two World Wars
concluded that:
the accumulated heritage of national strife and injury
that had divided Eastern Europe for centuries . . . gave
them all alike a sharper and deeper historic consciousness
than the nations of Western Europe. ... Like the Irish,
the only Western nation with a comparable experience,
these peoples- regained their freedom because they lived
among their ancient wrongs and glories. History was the
stuff of their politics, and all their politics turned
back to history. . . . The only Eastern European nations
that escaped the self-imposed burden of a mighty past were
Latvia, Estonia, and Finland. -"
Although the East Central Europe which has emerged from
the Soviet shadow is beset by a certain exhaustion, although
the reality of a global superpower world has made puny the
regional visions of greatness embodied in the East Central
European historical experience, and although some of the new
"Martin Wight, "Eastern Europe," in Arnold Toynbee, ed . , The world in
'-i.Lch 19 3;' , (London: oxford University Press, 1952), 221-222.
14
political leadership in East Central Europe contain men of
exceptional moral character, the regional experience since the
collapse of the Berlin wall suggests caution towards those who
would say that history no longer plays a prominent role in
either popular identity, or specific state activities. 21
Also, historical analysis as a window on the future and as
a guide to current policy has not been barren of past
successes, however rarely they occur, and despite how often
they are ignored. The Truman Doctrine and the original Cold
War strategy of Containment were based on an historical
analysis of the roots of Soviet conduct, and the implications
that that analysis held for Western policy directed against
Soviet expansion. The success of the resulting Cold War
strategy appears to have validated its historical
foundation ."
: For example, in the fighting between Serbia and Bosnia, many Serbs
appear to remain unremorseful about atrocities committed in Sarajevo.
"Indeed, as in almost every encounter here these days, any mention of
atrocities said to be committed by Serbs elicits a stream of counterclaims of
Serbian suffering at the hands of rivals and neighbors, starting in the
present and going back through both world wars to the period of Turkish
domination and Aust ro-Hungar lan swagget."
As one Serb explained the situation, "he said he did not think that
people in the West understood history. They should know that Serbs had lived
under Turkish domination, ... and he was certain thac Slavic Muslims in
Bosnia were intent on establishing an Islamic state and a Muslim toehold in
Europe. 'If they win, the Turks will be back,' he added." Michael T.
Kaufman, "Serbs See Themselves as the World's Victims," The New York Times
,
June 7, 1992, 6.
An example of historical analysis proved to be both accurate and
ignored was contained in a memorandum of the Historical Adviser to the
British Foreign Office on February 1925, in which was predicted the
consequences of a German -Russian alliance cemented by an attack on Poland:
"Has anyone attempted to realize what would happen ... if the Czechoslc
State were to be so curtailed and lismembered that in fact it disappeared
from the map of Europe? ... Imagine, foL Instance, that under some improbable
condition, Austria rejoined Germany; r h..it Germany using the discontented
minority in Bohemia, demanded a new frontier far over the mountains ... This
15
Since historical analogy plays a prominent role in current
foreign policy declarations, and since historical experience
is such a central element in the conduct of affairs in East
Central Europe, and since historical insight has sometimes
proved to have been a useful guide in foreign policy
formulation, what remains for this analysis is to decide how
to use history as a guideline for current policy discussions
on the post-Cold War security environment. Specifically, who
should be considered in the definition of East Central Europe?
In what way should East Central Europe be considered (as a
unit, or as a series of unique states not subject to regional
analysis)? How far back should the historical examination of
East Central Europe go? How is the scope of the historical
review unified within a theoretical or conceptual framework,
so as to prevent the narrative from devolving into a series of
'just so' stories? What are the hypothetical outcomes of the
theoretical framework?
B. WHAT IS EAST CENTRAL EUROPE
Prior to March 1991, the fundamental question of what is
East Central Europe would not have been difficult to answer,
and any regional analysis would have proceeded from a commonly
held set of assumptions. East Central Europe included the
would be catastrophic, and, even it we neglected to interfere in time tc
prevent it, we should afterwards be driven to interfere, probably too late.'
Sir James Headlam-Morley, studies in Diplomatic History
,
(London: Methuen,
1930), 183-184, in Martin Wight, "Eastern Europe," 239-240.
16
Warsaw Pact members, Yugoslavia, and Albania - the Communist
states outside of the Soviet Union. Several things have
challenged that old equation. In March 1991 the Warsaw. Pact
was formally dissolved, completing the process of
disentanglement from Soviet control begun in 1989. Soon
after, following the August Coup in 1991, the former republics
of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Byelorussia, Ukraine, and
Moldova became independent, and the Soviet Union was replaced
by a vaguely defined Commonwealth of Independent States.
Those qualities which had once defined Eastern Europe as East
Central Europe, a military alliance of Communist governments
outside of the Soviet Union, as well as Albania and
Yugoslavia, no longer exist. In particular, the addition of
a number of new states which consider themselves to be
European rather than Russian has confused things considerably.
Putting aside for a moment the question of whether East
Central Europe can continued to be analyzed as a regional
entity (as opposed to a series of unique individual states),
a singularly difficult and arbitrary question concerns the
inclusion of the former Soviet Republics within the broader
definition of Eastern Europe. Should these states be
considered along side those of East Central Europe in policy
analysis? And does their membership dilute insights gained
from a regional perspective? No firm test of membership makes
a case for the Baltic Republics, Byelorussia, Ukraine, and
Moldova either way. Absent clear criteria, the former Soviet
17
Republics are not considered in this analysis. Although none
are completely satisfactory, several factors support this
exclusion and subsequent concentration on East Central Europe
alone. Most important, of course, is the fact of formal (as
opposed to de facto) membership in the Soviet Union for much
of the period examined in this study. For the political
leadership in these countries, the bulk of foreign policy
efforts in the foreseeable future will involve the sorting out
of this Soviet legacy, and the formalizing of relationships
within the Commonwealth of Independent States. li Also, for
political leadership in Western Europe and the United States,
the Soviet legacy provides a significant psychological barrier
not found in discussions of countries not formerly within
Soviet borders.'14 For want of more strict conditions, this
This is a tenuous criteria Cor exclusion, but one which has a parallel
in the example of Greece. Prior to the political alignments of the Cold War,
Greece, like the other Balkan states, was consistently defined as being part
of Eastern Europe. A forty-three year affiliation with NATO has changed that
perceptual affiliation. Greece now is rarely thought of as Eastern European,
and is more often referred to in policy discussions as the southern flank of
Western Europe.
24There is no real reason why this should be so, but nonetheless it does
appear to be so. Present and future policies are the subject of chapter 5,
but one example illustrates the point. In a discussion of the Western
European Union (WEU) , Secretary General Dr. William van Eckland proposed a
three stage membership expansion strategy for the future. The first stage
would involve membership of the Northern Tier countries once those countries
had met certain economic, political, and military criteria; the second stage
would involve membership of the Southern Tier countries at a later time, but
under similar admissions requirements. Discussion of the third stage became
rather vague, however, and left one with the impression that beyond the
former borders of the Soviet Union lay the great unknown, and that
calculations pertinent to the first two membership expansions did not apply
to countries situated there. In chapter 5, this reticence is contrasted with
more expansive policy statements regarding larger and less defined
organizations such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE) and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) . Dr. Willem
Frederik van Eetcelen, Secretary-General of the Western European Union, in a
lecture on the future of a common European defense identity, given at the
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analysis focusses on East Central Europe exclusively, which is
to say Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria,
Albania, and what remains from the breakup of Yugoslavia
C. SCOPE OF THE ANALYSIS: IN DEFENSE OF THE REGIONAL
PERSPECTIVE
The confusion over which countries should be included in
this analysis raises a number of pertinent questions: is it
still appropriate to discuss policy in terms of East Central
Europe? By contrast, few when discussing Japan or China think
in terms of an Asian policy; the differences between the two
countries are simply too great, and, realistically, demand
individual policies which are at best mutually compatible.
Should the countries of East Central Europe be any different?
Does a regional perspective provide any useful insight? If
East Central Europe is still a realistic policy concept, who
should be included in it? What characterizes those that are
included?
East Central Europe is collectively defined by geographic
position, historical circumstance, and resulting geopolitical
weakness'"' - three criteria which allow the utility of a
regional perspective by constraining the foreign pp.licy
options of the individual states; common constraints suggest
a common identity, despite the very real differences among the
i i J " : L i ;...--/;•:....
, Ap i i . 29,1992.
"'Each of these factors are discussed an some length In subsequent:
;ec:C ions .
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individual societies. These common constraints have served to
insure that security arrangements in East Central Europe have
historically been determined not by regional wishes, but by
the wishes of Great Powers operating on regional borders. The
resulting hegemon-client relationship, particularly with
regard to the conduct of policy towards a danger which
directly threatens the hegemonic power, has traditionally
defined the East Central European security environment, and
has been the source of the group identity ascribed to what is
at heart an incredibly diverse region. It is the assertion
that the current security environment is still defined not by
the wishes of East Central European societies or governments,
but by the traditional constraints of a hegemon-client
relationship, which continues to validate a regional
perspective
.
Nonetheless, analysts often distinguish within East
Central Europe between a Northern Tier of Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, and a Southern Tier of Romania,
Bulgaria, Albania, and whatever states will proceed out of the
ongoing Yugoslavian Civil War.- 1 ' Although the bulk of this
analysis considers East Central" Europe as a whole, certain
policy recommendations benefit from the distinction between
Northern Tier and Southern Tier.
"Candidates ai.e Serbia, Croat i,., , Slovenia, Bosnia, Montenegri
Herzegovinia , and Macedonia.
2
D. DEPTH OF THE ANALYSIS: HOW FAR BACK IS ENOUGH
Where should one begin an analysis of a region fraught
with so many ancient antagonisms, slights, and triumphs, all
held so close to the current social identity? Since East
Central Europe is defined in this study as Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and the
legacy of Yugoslavia, the narrative begins with 1919 - the
first year in which all of those states existed as independent
political entities at the same time, and in a cartographical
form recognizable today. Any historical analysis of the East
Central Europe which existed before 1919 is done only to
establish what are arguably the two dominant themes guiding
subsequent regional security development : the haphazard and
violent nature surrounding the birth of the individual states,
and tragedy extant in the triumph of the Bolshevik Revolution
in Russia in 1917. Each theme has played a central role in
the evolution of East Central Europe as both a buffer and a
highway between hostile camps on either side, and neither
theme has fully receded in importance with the end of the Cold
War
.
In confining the analysis to the seventy-three years
dividing 1919 and the present day, one can distinguish within
that period a number of natural divisions. Specifically (as
already alluded to in the introduction) , within a greater
European security context, East Central Europe has survived
three distinct phases since its inception. The first phase
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began with the birth of East Central Europe - assured by
Western support amidst imperial ruin and Bolshevik generation
in 1919 - and ended with the Soviet occupation in 1945. The
second phase began with the cementing of Soviet hegemony in
the late 1940s, and ended only with the revolutions in 1989.
The third phase began in 1989 with the reestablishment of
nominally democratic regimes - again dependent on Western
support - and will undoubtedly end at some undetermined time
in the future.
E. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND THEORY
At first glance, little seems to unite the natural
divisions alluded to above. The first security phase
represented the last gasp of the international epoch defined
by Great Power theory - the final crisis and collapse of the
European Great Power system. The second security phase
reflected the global divisions of a two superpower world so
accurately predicted in the nineteenth century by de
Toqueville - the triumph of America and Russia over the power
of Europe. The third security phase is difficult to define,
and may yet prove to be the expression of a single superpower
paradigm - a Pax Americana - or a return to a Great Power
system, but a Great Power system not confined to Europe.
What, then, unites these three natural divisions in the
security environment in East Central Europe? Setting aside
for a moment considerations of the third security phase, and
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using the natural divisions expressed above, one can state
clearly that from the First World War emerged a set of
conditions which directly produced the long-term contest
between Soviet Russia and the industrial West. Throughout
this contest, the newly created states of East Central Europe
served as the critical area, the buffer, the no-man's-land,
first for the West (phase one) , and then for the Soviets
(phase two) , against the spread of the deadly contagion
carried by the other side. Indeed, ideology not withstanding,
the fear of contagion on the part of the hegemonic power was
the central justification for a given East Central European
security policy. 27 For twenty-six and forty-four years
respectively, East Central Europe performed its role in the
long-term contest effectively, halting the spread of
Bolshevism into Europe, and capitalist bourgeois democracy
into Russia.
This simple interpretation of events J8 reveals a number of
pertinent assumptions. The first involves the issue of
hegemony; the second, the concept of a hegemonic power; the
third, the defining of a security phase by the hegemon-client
relationship; and the fourth, the coalescence of hegemony
within the analytical constructs of a monolithic East and a
' In this way Woodrow Wilson with his concern for national self-
determination, and Joseph Stalin - champion of the international Communist
ement resembled each other i/athet' :1 isely (not in the realm of activity,
. 11 in understanding of the threat).
jaThe justification of which is the subject of chapter III.
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definable and singular West. Regarding the issue of hegemony,
no clear criteria exists for what defines a position of
irresistible leverage and authority between one nation and
another. Several candidates suggest themselves, and all have
had a position in defining the various security phases in East
Central Europe. On the part of the actor exerting hegemony -
economic strength, military potential, military occupation,
military guarantee against external threat, moral leadership
and prestige, and political support for unpopular regimes -
all influence, either singly or in combination, a hegemonic
relationship. On the part of the actor subject to hegemonic
influence, a particular vulnerability, again arising from
economic, military, moral, and political factors, provides the
first opening for a relationship marked by unequal leverage or
authority
.
Clearly these ingredients for a hegemon-client relation
have been a traditional foundation upon which security
arrangements have been based in East Central Europe. One
analyst, describing the situation on the eve of the Second
World War, characterized East Central Europe as, "a belt of
small countries lying between Germany and Italy on the one
side and Russia on the other: a buffer zone ... a line of
states, which varied in size, but were all small and weak
compared with the Great Powers on the west and east." 29 The
"Mart in Wight, "Eastern Europe," 206. (emphasis added)
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sources of this weakness are the subject of subsequent
discussion, but the results of this weakness, an evolving
hegemon-client relationship, seems an undeniable byproduct of
the East Central European position.
Concerning the concept of hegemonic power: in terms of the
role, history, and prospects of East Central Europe within a
greater European security context, both Russia (either
Imperial, Soviet, or post-Soviet) and the West function as
singular entities. This analytical construct seems self-
apparent with regard to Russian influence, but is less so when
applied to so amorphous an idea as the West. Although either
political circumstances or competition between individual
actors within the West (in its broadest sense Western Europe
and the Atlantic community) have at times produced different
spokesmen, those individual spokesmen have been symbols of de
facto policy coherence with regard to East Central Europe.
For example, in 1919 the West was represented by the
wishes of the Big Four at the Paris Peace Conference acting
through the policy instruments of American moral prestige,
money, and food, and French military power. By the 1920s,
American retreat into isolation and British indifference
allowed the West to be represented by French interests acting
through the policy instruments of political alliance and
military guarantee. By the mid 1930s, French economic
protectionism allowed the West to be represented by Germany
through the economic policy instrument. With the coming of
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the Cold War, the dislocations of the Second World War allowed
the West to be represented by the United States using the
policy instruments of economic aid, military alliance, moral
authority, and nuclear guarantee. What will represent the
West with respect to East Central Europe in the future is
unclear, but American military withdrawal may allow Germany,
either singly or acting in concert with others of her West
European neighbors, to retake the role of spokesman using a
variety of policy instruments. 30
Given this analytical construct, the proposed model argues
that the respective failures of either Russia or the West as
hegemonic power with regard to East Central Europe stem from
significant fractures (either political, economic, or
military) within either monolithic camp. When German
expansionist desires made her an unacceptable spokesman for
Western policy, conflict resulted, and Soviet Russia replaced
the West as the hegemonic power in East Central Europe. 31
Concerning the defining of a security phase by the
hegemon-client relationship: the historical circumstances in
which the hegemon status has been conferred first on the West,
then on Russia, and now on the West again have marked major
turning points in the international order in general, and on
the social context within East Central Europe in particular.
/-. joh' ••* Lai. Lot: /i/hich Ls reserve*:! cor the final chaptei of this stud\ .
The coxiapse of che first and second security phases is the subje :c
:>f chapter III.
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In each of the three security phases suggested, East Central
Europe has been a remarkably different place within which to
live, and within which to conduct security policy. Consistent
to these great changes has been the transference of hegemon
status between Russia and the West.
This investigation centers around a pattern involving the
relationship between five variables and the hegemonic power of
a particular security phase in East Central Europe (first the
West, then the Soviets, and now the West again) : the
perception by the hegemonic power of the threat facing it, the
plan formulated by the hegemonic power with regard to East
Central Europe to counter the threat, the activities
proceeding from the plan (particularly in the current context,
where activity serves as a guide in the absence of an overtly
stated program) , the evolving internal weaknesses of the
hegemonic power, and the role of East Central Europe as a
catalyst in those evolving weaknesses. The matching amongst
the three security phases of this variable/hegemon
relationship serves to illuminate better current roles and
prospects not clarified by comprehensive, authoritative
international policy documents, as well as to indicate the
future prospects of East Central Europe within a Western-
dominated, post-Cold War security arrangement.
As an analytical construct, this model proposes the role
of East Central Europe within a larger European security
arrangement as the outcome variable (or central puzzle) , the
27
presence of a hegemonic power guiding such security
arrangements as a constant, and the five relationships cited
as the independent variables, or proof of the proposed
argument. The first three independent variables reflect the
creation of a specific role for East Central Europe within a
particular security phase, and correspond to the three initial
steps of the generic strategy process: determining security
objectives, formulating grand strategy, and apportioning the
proper policy instruments to the conduct of grand strategy. 32
The final two independent variables are more arbitrary,
reflect the process of decline endemic to the end of a
particular security phase, and proceed more from the research
surrounding this analysis than from any preconceived
analytical construct.
F. HYPOTHESIS
The collapse of Soviet power, the resulting end of the
long-term contest, and the arrival of Western hegemony have
not ended the traditional role for East Central Europe, but
have only made it less apparent - less defined as the threat
perceived by the hegemonic power has become less defined.
Both the arrival of Marxism in Eastern Europe in 1945
(destruction of phase one) and the surging of Western-style
democracy in 1989 (destruction of phase two) occurred through
"Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow, M..tk.mn ^tL'arer;, an Introduce ion
t'.' National ."ecunry
.
pro'-re.-j-.-e..-: ..ijj'.l ii ol; l>-m.- , (Maxwell Ail Force Base,
Alabama: Air University F-ress, 19R3), 14-17.
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a process of moral collapse in the heart of the respective
contestants, not through ineffectiveness of the East Central
European buffer per se. In both cases, however, East Central
Europe played a significant role as either a catalyst or
accelerator of this internal weakness of the hegemonic power
(in a sense acting as a highway rather than a buffer) . East
Central Europe continues to serve a traditional security role
for a new hegemonic power. Accordingly, future prospects
hinge less on activity in Russia (at the far side of the
buffer) , and more within the internal workings of the West -
within potential internal weaknesses subject to acceleration
by the East Central European political dynamic.
29
III. PYGMY BETWEEN TWO GIANTS
"The War of the Giants has ended. The quarrels of the
pygmies have begun. ""
The purpose of the second chapter is to establish the two
themes permeating security affairs in East Central Europe from
1919 to the present day: the factor of violent, haphazard
birth, and the influence of Bolshevik triumph adjacent to East
Central European borders. The unfortunate juxtaposition of
these two factors created two mutually exclusive security
conditions within East Central Europe: the requirement that
East Central Europe exist as a buffer, balanced against
internal regional factors which tended to mitigate against the
effectiveness of that buffer once in place.
A. CONTEXT: IMPERIAL DECLINE AND VIOLENT BIRTH
The astonishing thing is- that for so long there was no
East Central Europe. There were, of course, imperial
provinces, coal mines and breadbaskets for far-off capitals,
sources of fodder for greater ambitions, and breeding grounds
of ethnic pride and stunted desires. But there was no East
Central Europe; it was subsumed by a zeal intent upon
eradication and annexation into larger bodies, so that by 1914
'"Remark by Winston JhuL'chill Co L.1 ., o George apon the den eat of Germany
in 1913. Lincoln, B.,
_
M victor/ , L r-)H'), p.i97.
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the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian Empires were, more
or less, firmly in control. With the decline of the Ottomans,
however, East Central Europe violently came into being - a
Balkan orphan both desirable and beyond suppression. The
Ottoman mother, as well as her attending imperial midwives,
failed to survive the birth, so that by 1919 East Central
Europe had became a fact to be reckoned with in the policy
discussions of the industrial West.
The Southern Tier was the first to initiate this process,
although exactly when is still open to question. Since its
high tide at Vienna in 163 0, the Ottoman Empire had been in a
military decline compounded by internal political turmoil. By
1908 this process began to accelerate with the coming of the
Young Turk revolution, and the fall of the Ottoman Sultan. 34
Although considered progressive, many of the new leaders had
been recruited from the Ottoman army, and had had for their
34Like so many important events, Che Young Turk revolution was sparked
by an accident. Within the Empire of Sultan Abdul Hamid, a number of secret
political societies had sprung up in response to the atmosphere of political
intolerance. Because of the effectiveness of the secret police in quelling
such groups in Constantinople, the focal point of much of this secret
political activity was in the then ottoman port of Salonika. A fertile
breeding ground for recruits to these societies was 'in the ottoman Third Army
responsible for policing the disintegrating situation in Macedonia. one of
these groups was the Committee of Union and ['regress (CUP) , also known as the
Young Turk Party, and one of its members was a young army officer named
Enver
.
In 1908, Enver was recalled to Constantinople. Fearing that his role in
the CUP had been discovered, Enver took to the hills around Salonika. Soon
other officers joined him, bringing their troops with them. An ottoman
'column sent by the Sultan to quell the insurrection joined the rebels.
Within a year, this ad hoc: revolution had :aused the abdication of the
Sultan, the Lestoration jf the :onsf itut ion, parliament, and pol I
parties. The (''Ming Turks became the powei behind the new ottoman government.
David Fl . ink in , A ^--.v.-'H- '.' En.i A.: ;>-v-, •- T'::~ ? >, 1 . _: r he 't r Miuin Empire
tne Creation of the Modern Middle East, Clew York: Avon Books, 1089), 39-4:.
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formative experiences the project of policing the Empire's
crumbling European holdings. The new government was not
inclined to be progressive about assimilation within the
Empire, and soon sponsored a crackdown on Greek Orthodox




This newly invigorated repression paid immediate dividends
for the new Ottoman leadership, as Bulgaria declared
independence in 1908, Crete formally united with an
independent Greece in 1912, and Albania gained independence in
1913. 3b Concurrent with these new national formations were
a series of crises, again issuing from Ottoman decline and
important to the formation of the Southern Tier of East
Central Europe. Austria exploited the confusion of the Young
Turk revolution to annex Bosnia and Herzegovinia in 1908,'
3SDavid Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace , 36-37, 40-41, 43.
Joseph R. Strayer, Hans w. Gatzke, and E. Harris Harbison, The
Mainstream of Civilization Since 1500
,
2cd ed. , (New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, Inc., 1974), 690.
These new players joined the already independent East Central European
states of Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece.
i7This was a formal move. The Austro-Hungarian Empire had administered
Bosnia and Herzegovinia on behalf of the -ottomans since 1878.
After defeat in che Russo-Japanese War, Russian ambition had directed
itself westward. The principal ambition of Russian foreign policy was the
opening of the Turkish straits for Russian warships. Russian policy found a
sympathetic ear in the Austrian foreign ministry. A secret meeting was
conducted in 1908 between the Russian Foreign Minister, Alexander Izvolsky,
and his Austrian counterpart, Count Aehrenthal. What resulted was the
Buchlau Agreement of 1908, in which Austria was pledged to support Russian
plans with regard to the Turkish Straits, and Russia was pledged to support
Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovinia.
Unfortunately, Austria began annexation without consultation, and before
Russia was ready to move on the Straits. Russia was understandably concerned
by this breech of the secret protocol. Joseph R. Strayer, er al . The
Mainstream of Civilization Since 1500, 690-691.
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and in so doing incurred the anger of Russia and Russia's
Balkan client, Serbia. 38 Russia requested on behalf of
Serbia an international conference among the Great Powers to
settle the dispute, but retreated in the face of German
support of the Austrian position. Russia, ill-prepared to
oppose Germany, convinced a bitter Serbia to accept the status
39quo
.
The Bosnian Crisis was but the first of several events
which shaped the formation of the Southern Tier. In 1911,
hard on the heels of the Moroccan Crisis and with the full
support of the other Great Powers, Italy annexed Tripoli and
began the Tripolitanian War with the Ottoman Empire. The
circumstances surrounding this war encouraged the Balkan
states to pursue their own ambitions with reference to the
remaining Ottoman holdings in Europe. Toward this end,
Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro formed the Balkan
League in 1912, and soon after invaded Ottoman holdings. This
First Balkan War resulted in the Treaty of London, signed in
Developing Serbian nationalism had been greatly influenced by die
Russian ideology of pan-Slavism, but with an important twist: father than a
collection of European slavs under the benevolent leadership of Russia,
Serbia envisioned a collection of South Central European slavs under the
benevolent leadership of Serbia. Put more bluntly, Serbia had her own plans
for annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovinia , and was bitterly disappointed that
those plans had been preempted by the Austrians. Joseph Strayer, et al., The
Mainstream of Civilization Since 1500
,
S91. Also, Frank H. Simonds, History
o f the Wo rid War, Vo 1 . 1 , (Mew York: Doubleday Page & Company, 1917), 40
Joseph R. Strayer, et al . , The M>-t inc. r l earn of Civilization Since 15 ,
691. David Fromkin, A cecice to End all F'eace
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May 1913, which divested the Ottoman Empire of European
territories apart from Eastern Thrace. 40
The London Conference which had produced the treaty
resulted from Great Power intervention in the War aims of the
Balkan League. When the League was formed, Serbia was
promised from the spoils access to the Adriatic through
annexation of northern Albania. 41 Serb ambitions with regard
to slavs still under Hapsburg rule, as well as the Serbian
special relationship with Russia, caused the Austrians and
Italians to protest Serbian access under the cause of a free
and independent Albania. This cause of Albanian independence
was taken up by the British Foreign Minister, Sir Edward Grey.
Once again, Serbia was forced to back down. 42
Her ambitions in Albania thus frustrated, Serbia turned to
the newly acquired Bulgarian gains for compensation. 43 This
compensation Bulgaria was unwilling to provide. This
unwillingness to compromise was unfortunate, because shortly
afterwards Serbia, Greece, Montenegro, Romania, and Turkey
declared war on Bulgaria. The Second Balkan War ended with
40Joseph R. Strayer, et al., The Mainstream of Civilization Since 1500 ,
692. David Fromkin, A Peace to End all Peace , 45. Frank H. Simonds, History
of the World War
,
32-34.
4 Remembering of course, that Albania had not yet achieved independence.
4zFrank H. Simmonds, .-iistoiv jf tne ^L'eat War , 34-35.
^Specifically, the Vardar '/alley in Macedonia.
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the Treaty of Bucharest in August 1913, in which Greece and
Serbia acquired the bulk of Macedonia. 44
The final chapter in the formation of the Southern Tier
prior to the First World War involved Serbian claims,
subsequent to the Treaty of Bucharest, on Albanian territory.
In this ambition Serbia was supported by Russia and opposed by
Austria. Austria proposed a military intervention in Serbia,
and was restrained from this course by Germany. Italy also
continued to oppose Serbian access to the Adriatic, as did the
British, who were by this time enamored by the justice of
Albanian independence. In the face of such concerted
opposition, Russia once again backed away from Serbian claims.
The immediate result was a Serbian hatred for Austria, and for
Austria, a deep distrust of Serbian intentions
.
4C
In July 1914, this equation was confirmed by the
assassination of the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand, and the
subsequently famous Austrian ultimatum. 40 The Balkan problem
44
FL"ank H. Simmonds, History of the creat War , 35-39. David Fromkin,
A Peace to End all Peace , 45. Joseph R. Strayer, et al., The Mainstream of
Civilization Since 1500 , 692.
4




bThe ultimatum, sent on July 23, 1917, prescribed censorship
regulations with regard to anti -Austrian propaganda, specific measures to be
taken against the propagandists themselves, the disbanding of ant i -Austrian
patriotic societies, and the punishment of society leaders irregardless of
whether they were serving members of the Serbian government or military.
Most galling for the Serbians was the requirement that these prescriptions be
carried out by Austrian officials on Serbian soil. Compliance with the
ultimatum was required within forty-eight hours of receipt. Frank H.




>. Joseph R- Strayer, et al., The
Mainstream of Civilization Since 1500, >•>') 3 .
35
subsequently insured that by August 1914, the wheels of
international diplomacy were slowly moving towards the Great
War. It was from these circumstances of violent, haphazard,
and ethnically chauvinistic origin that the Southern Tier of
the belt of small states which would come to be East Central
Europe came into being.
Although the birth of the Southern Tier predated the
Northern Tisr by some four years, the circumstances of
creation were not remarkably different, either in terms of
haphazardness or international violence. Again, exactly where
the process began is difficult to pinpoint, but the case of
Poland provides a useful start . Poland lost her statehood in
1795, when the Third Partition distributed her remaining
territory between the Prussian, Austrian, and Russian empires.
Polish patriotism came to be defined roughly then, in terms of
opposition to whatever empire controlled a given patriot's
home; who one hated depended on where one lived. By the
beginning of the First World War, patriotic political
agitation was polarized by various factions who supported
Although the causes of the First World War are outside the scope of this
study, results of the assassination are well known and worth recounting
briefly. Serbia refused Austria's ultimatum; Austria, bolstered by German
support (often 'jailed the 'blank check') prepared to invade Germany; Russia,
in support of its Serbian ally, declared war on Austria,- Germany declared
war on Russia,- France, an ally of Russia, declared war on Germany; Germany,
In ileference to the Schlieffen Plan, refuseu to guarantee Belgium neutrality;
Great Britain, unwilling to see Great fowei dominance of the Low Countries,
declared //ar on Germany. Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of Auuust , (New York:
Dell Publishing Company, In:., 19 62), 3 J -135.
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different national objectives. 47 This polarization resulted
in a policy of border alignments at the expense of both
Germany and Soviet Russia.
The border adjustments at the expense of Germany were
supported by Allied leadership at the Paris Peace Conference,
but Polish claims in the east were received with less
enthusiasm. 48 Meanwhile, German troops had withdrawn from
4 This factionalism was illustrated by the competition between Marshall
Pulsudski's Leftist platform, and the more conservative program of his chief
political rival, Roman Dmowski. Pilsudski had been born in Wilno (Vilnius),
and considered Lithuania an integral part of historic Poland (as a
contemporary biographer remarked, Pilsudski considered Wilno "a better
Poland, a Lithuanian Poland."), and the reclaiming of Poland's eastern
borderlands in Byelorussia and Ukraine as integral to establishing a modern
Polish state. The greatest enemy of Poland was Russia, whether ruled by the
Czar, the Bolsheviks, or the Whites. In this anti-Russian feeling Pilsudski
had long experience: first as a political prisoner in Siberia from 1887-1892,
then in exile in London from 1896-1905, then as an inmate in a Russian insane
•asylum (where he faked illness to escape greater punishment) from 1905-1908,
and finally as a train robber in 1908 when he stole two-hundred and fifty
thousand rubles to support Polish rebellion.
At the beginning of the War, Pilsudski 's notoriety had not gained him
any great political popularity in Poland; that belonged to his rival Dmowski.
Dmowski was from the German portion of Poland, and fear of German ambition
fueled his political vision. With Che beginning of the War, Dmowski went
into exile with the Allied governments, and at the time of the Paris Peace
Conference was considered the legitimate chief of the Polish delegation.
Pilsudski spent the war in command of the Polish Legion in the service of
Germany. With the Russian Revolution in the spring of 1917, Pilsudski
withdrew the Legion from fighting, had it interred, and was himself
imprisoned by the Germans. This act on behalf of Polish nationalism gained
Pilsudski enormous prestige, and while Dmowski was stuck in E'aris, Pilsudski
formed a Polish government in Warsaw with the collapse of German power on
November 10, 1918. In the subsequent elections to the Constituent Assembly,
Dmowski 's party achieved a majority.
What this meant for Polish foreign policy and national formation was a
desire for liberal border settlements in the West at Germany's expense
(championed by the Constituent Assembly), and generous expansion eastward at
Russia's expense (championed by Pilsudski). What resulted was the Polish-
Soviet war, and the enmity of two temporarily weak Great Powers at Poland's
frontiers. Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe Between the Two World
Wars
,
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dThe Allies agreed that Poland's eastern boundary should be established




the Oberkommando-Ost front dividing Poland's eastern
borderlands, and both Polish and Bolshevik troops moved in to
fill the void. The resulting small unit clashes characterized
the region under contention until April 1919, when Poland
opted for invasion of Soviet territory. 4q
The Polish invasion signalled the start of the Polish-
Soviet War, and as such was the culmination of a number of
serious political miscalculations. Polish leadership
genuinely believed that the people of the border regions
(particularly Lithuanians) wanted a restoration of historic
Poland; such was not the case. Also, the Poles overestimated
the damage that the World War and Revolution had visited on
the Russian ability to fight, as well as the support that
could be expected from the Allies for Polish objectives.
Nonetheless, the Polish invasion met with great initial
success, the high tide of which was the occupation of Kiev in
early May 1919. 50
4yThe opening incident of the Polish-Soviet war cook place an the small
village of Bereza Kartuska on February 14, 1919. At that time Bolshevik
forces were arrayed .all around the periphery of the former Russian Empire in
conduct of the Civil War. Total Bolshevik forces in the West by April
numbered forty-six thousand. Against them were two-hundred thousand Poles
who would soon be supplemented by the return of the various Polish Legions
which had fought for each of the former occupying empires. W. Bruce Lincoln,
Red Victory , 399-400.
j0The Polish army captured Wilno on April 21, 1919, and Minsk and Lvov
by that June. Peace negotiations were entered into with the Bolsheviks from
October to December 1919.. The Polish delegation walked away from the
negotiations in December, and resumed the offensive into the Ukraine on All LI
25, 1920. once again initial successes were good, as Polish forces advanced
fifty miles in the first twenty-foui hours. By May 7, polish forces occupied
Kiev. w. Bruce Lincoln, Red Victory, 101-409.
38
Initial Polish gains were quickly reversed however, first
in late May and early June 1920, when the Bolsheviks
reoccupied Kiev, and then especially in July when a general
Bolshevik offensive was begun to trap Polish troops inside the
Ukraine. By mid August, after a string of dramatic successes,
Soviet forces were investing Warsaw.-' 1 In crossing the
Curzon Line into what the Paris Peace Conference considered to
be Poland proper, the Soviet government encouraged greater
Allied military support for the Polish cause. 5<i This Allied
support, along with renewed White military efforts in southern
Russia, allowed the Polish army to narrowly win the Battle of
Warsaw in August, and to begin a process of territorial
reclamation in September and October. Although Lithuania
remained independent, Wilno was returned to Polish control by
:The two critical factors in the Soviet turnaround were the assignment
of Mikhail Tukhachevskii, then only twenty-seven years old, as commander of
the western forces (April 29, 1920), and the redistribution of forces,
recently triumphant over Kolchak in Siberia and Denikin in the Donbass, to
Tukhachevskii
' s command. The combination of adequate forces and at times
brilliant leadership proved irresistible. In June Kiev was recaptured; In
July, Soviet forces crossed the Berezina River, capturing Minsk on July 13
and Wilno on July 14 (the lattei */a; .....seed by the local Lithuanian
population, which had finally been promised independence by the Bolshevik
regime); Soon after, the Curzon Line was breached, and Brest -Litovsk taken.
W. Bruce Lincoln, Red Victory
,
409-415.
Lord Curzon, British Foreign Secretary, delivered a letter to Soviet
Foreign Minister Chicherin which encouraged the Soviet government not to send
troops west of the Bug River. Chicherin rejected Curzon 's letter. As
President of the Second Comintern Congress Zinoviev recalled, "the best
representatives of the International proletariat ... all perfectly realized
that, if the military aim of out army was achieved, Lc would mean an immense





mid October. c'- On October 12, 1920 an armistice was signed,
and the war was finally concluded with the Treaty of Riga on
March 22, 1921. Despite the tremendous Soviet successes in
the spring and summer of 1920, by the end of the fighting
Poland retained territorial borders one-hundred miles to the
east of the Curzon Line.*54
Although benign by comparison, the situation in Poland's
two southern neighbors was also marked by a certain shading of
anarchy and armed violence. The Czechs were perhaps best
positioned to take advantage peacefully of the imperial
disintegration forming East Central Europe, and to a large
degree they were able to do so. 55 With regard to Allied
support for claims in the Hungarian controlled section of
~' 3To protect Allied sensibilities, which supported the cause of
Lithuanian independence, a mock uprising was staged in Wilno, and that city
turned itself over to Polish control. W. Bruce Lincoln, Red Victory , 419.
54W. Bruce Lincoln, Red Victory , 414-420.
The Czech success in achieving most of their territorial aims short
of violence was the product of the formidable negotiating talents of three
Czech exiles: T.G. Massaryk, Eduard Benes, and Milan Stefanik. The Czech
negotiating team sold the Allies a contradictory proposition: that
Czechoslovakia should retain historic borders in opposition to the national
claims of Sudeten Germans in Silesia and ethnic Poles in Silesia and
Slovakia, and that Czechoslovakia should retain national borders in
opposition to the historic claims of Hungary in Slovakia and Ruthenia. For
strategic and economic reasons, the Allies quickly accepted the first
proposition; the Allies were hesitant, however, in granting the second
proposition. Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Wars , 76-78.
In Poland, he same negotiating tactic was used. As one observer at the
time explained, "a Polish diplomat expounded to me the very extensive (and
mutually contradictory) territorial claims of his country, and I inquired on
what principle they were based, he replied with rare frankness: 'On the
historical principle, corrected by the linguistic wherever it works in our
favor.' " L.B. Marnier, "1348: The Revolution of the Intellectuals," Raleigh
Lecture on History, 1944, from the 1- 1 > •eeuings of the BritLsh Ac.idemv, '.'..
xxx, (London: oxford University Press, 1944), 66, in Martin Wight, "Eastern
Europe," Arnold Toynbee, ed., The Woild in March 1939
,
(London: uxford
University Press 1952), 230.
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Slovakia, Czech leaders thought to speed the process along by
military occupation of the affected territory in May 1919.
This thought proved a mistake, because it provoked an
unsuccessful military campaign with the Hungarian Communist
government of Bela Kun
.
S6
At war's end, Hungary planned to retain its historic
borders and dominant position within those borders not by
reform or compromise with its ethnic minorities, but by
abandoning its treaty ties with Germany and its constitutional
ties with Austria in the hope that a gullible West would see
Hungary as the victim of Germanic repression.- The old
regime was replaced in Budapest by a popular and bloodless
uprising on October 31, 1918, and a reform government under
Count Mihaly Karolyi came into power, too late, however, to
stop the national dismemberment of Hungary's historic
borders . 5S
'' Joseph Rothschild, East cer.r i -, ^ Europe Between the Two World Wars ,
147-148.
Ail example of Hungarian arrogance involved the Belgrade Armistice with
Romania. Signed two days after the armistice in the West (November 13,
1918), the armistice ceded large tracks of Romanian territory to a dominant
Hungary. Hungarian political leadership seemed unable to understand that
imperial collapse would demand a change in attitude towards neighbors,
'seph Rothschild, Easj ...'enr, l-.i! Europe Be r ween nl ie Two World Wat.- , L39.
C j
'Joseph Rothschild, :--i.-. - '-:;': . ".; l i - ^< .-.>—;. r . : >- .> : . , i am : . , lJ->-
140.
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This process was momentarily arrested by the placement in
power of Bela Kun's Hungarian Communist Party,"' and the
subsequent offensive against new Czech holdings in Slovakia in
May 1920. By June, Hungarian forces held two-thirds of
Slovakia, and had severed ground communications in Ruthenia
between Czech and Romanian forces. The Allies were
uncomfortable with the Hungarian success, and in mid June
issued a series of ultimatums requiring that Hungarian forces
evacuate virtually all of Slovakia. Initial Hungarian
calculations had depended on both Russian communist military
support, as well as spontaneous revolutionary uprisings in the
West to cement territorial gains. When neither condition
occurred, Kun was forced to accede to Allied wishes and
withdraw his forces 60
9During the First World War, some five-hundred thousand Hungarian
prisoners were interred in Russia. A certain fraction became politicized,
and began fighting on behalf of the Reds in the Civil War. This fraction, at
a conference in Moscow, formed the Hungarian Communist Party on November 4,
1918, and promptly sent two hundred agitators to Hungary to politicize the
reform movement of Karolyi's regime.
.
Three-hundred more were sent in March
1919. One of the first to go back (arriving in Budapest on November 16,
1918) was a former Hungarian journalist and leader of- the new party, Bela
Kun. Kun soon started a newspaper and began agitating among workers. Calls
in the party newspaper for an uprising on February 3 and 6, 1919 resulted in
Kun's arrest and imprisonment. The imprisonment served to martyr Kun, and
cast the Karolyi regime in the repressive light of its predecessor.
Further unrest was fueled by the Allies reinterpret ing the Belgrade
Armistice to favor Romanian border rlaims. Kun strongly opposed any more
concessions, and gamed a following in the small republican army. Further
Allied demands for border redrawing, the Vyx demarche of March 20, 1919,
resulted in the fall of the Karolyi regime, and the merger of the socialist
political leadership wich Kun's Communist Party, on March 21, 1919, Kun came
to power. Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars
,
143-145.
Because Kun had ;:ome to power largely through his opposition to bordei
restructuring, capitulation to Allied demands forced tiis resignation ... I
exile. The remnants of his government was left in Budapes-r: to face the
consequences of Communist rule. Joseph Rothschild, Easi central EuL'.'pe
Between the Two World Wars, 145-149.
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Kun ' s successors, in a last ditch effort to secure public
support, conducted an attack on Romania in July which only
succeeded in disintegrating after three days. Unfortunately,
internal conservative opposition used this opportunity to
invite an invasion of Hungary by Romanian forces. 51 The
Romanians entered Budapest on August 4, 1919, and stayed until
November 14 of the same year. During this time, the Romanians
liquidated the remnants of the Kun regime, and thoroughly
invested and raped the Hungarian capitol. Two days after the
Romanians evacuated Budapest, the conservative administration
formed at Szeged entered the city."
The Northern Tier, like its southern neighbor, was born of
chaotic and violent circumstances. By the end of 1919, the
imperial collapse had created in East Central Europe a band of
nominally independent states which purported to represent both
the current needs and historic aspirations of largely
ethnically homogenous populations, but which were subject to
the traditional power equations which mitigated against their
previous existence. That the governments in place in East
Central Europe often failed to represent current needs,
exploited historic aspirations at the expense of neighbors,
A group of conservative old regime members had retired to the southern
university city of Szeged and had raised an army of sixteen -thousand under an
Admiral Horthy. Rather than pit this force against the remaining supporters
of the Communist regime, the Horthy grout;' encouraged a Romanian invasion so
"that Romanian forces :ould eliminate leftist political opposition. Joseph
Rothschild, E.j.;t ".'entiai E^r^oe Ber.we-^:. ':.- !"; >> L i W-i:.- , l~ 2 .




and only rarely resided over homogenous populations - all
within a formative atmosphere of national passion and
international violence - set in train the seeds of much which
would follow.
The birth of East Central Europe was compounded by a
tragic event adjacent to its borders: the triumph of
Bolshevism and the formation of Soviet Russia. The ten days
in October 1917 within which the Bolshevik coup took place
unleashed on the world a theology, dedicated clerisy, and
traditional power potential both hostile to Western democratic
and social values, and threatening to Western security. As
the Civil War in Russia expanded throughout 1919 and into
1920, and as Bolshevik defeat began to seem less and less
likely, this fact of a hostile and threatening Soviet Russia -
a Russia which, unbeknown to contemporary observers, would be
destined to engage in a bitter seventy-four year contest with
the West - weighed heavily on the minds of those chosen to
fashion a lasting European security.
Within each of the security phases which were to follow,
these unfortunate determinants of haphazard birth and dimly
perceived long-term contest were to provide the foundation





The nations of East Central Europe - Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary (the Northern Tier), Romania,
Bulgaria, Albania, and the inheritors of Yugoslavia (the
Southern Tier) - form a geographic barrier between Russia and
the industrial West . Proceeding from a process of imperial
disintegration, East Central Europe is the product of two
defining realities: violent, chaotic, haphazard birth, and the
formation of a Soviet state in ideological opposition to the
industrial West. These two defining experiences have
constrained the security prospects of East Central Europe to
that of a buffer between East and West.
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IV. AT THE CREATION
"The path of the world conflagration passes over the
corpse of Poland. " b3
The purpose of this chapter is to develop the
circumstances surrounding the creation of the first and second
security phases in East Central Europe, to examine the
political calculations central to the deliberations of the
respective policy makers, and to analyze those factors common
to each phase.
A. 1919: EAST CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE FIRST SECURITY PHASE
The armistice which ended the fighting of the First World
War in November 1918 signalled the end of a Great Power system
which had regulated international affairs since the Congress
of Vienna in 1815. At Vienna, what a later observer would
call, "the misguided, the reactionary, the after all pathetic
aristocrats," of that time conducted negotiations for a new
system in secret and from a philosophy of 'compensations' and
'transference of souls', reducing the affected populations to
'"Remark made by Mikhail Tukhacnevaki i luring the fighting of the
Pol ish-SovieC War. w. Bruce Lincoln, P-.-;l y^Tvly, 402.
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the status of pawns on the Great Power chessboard. 64 Such
was not the atmosphere of the Allied delegations who proceeded
to Paris after the armistice to fashion a peace consistent
with the sacrifices of the war.
In broad terms, the delegations which gathered at Paris
wished to end the fighting still ongoing in the wake of
imperial collapse (to stabilize a chaotic situation), to
define the status of the vanquished powers, to attack what
Harold Nicolson was a member of the British delegation which embarked
Cor che E'aris Peace Conference an the end on LT18. His is perhaps '.-'tie of the
best first hand accounts of the emotional and perceptual flavor of the
proceedings. Peacemaking i'j L'j , (New <'ork: the University Library, Grosset &
Dunlap, 1965) , 31
.
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were perceived as the systemic and underlying causes which had
led to the fighting, to fashion a new international structure
which would prevent a relapse in the future, and finally, to
overcome any ongoing problems which could be perceived as an
obstacle to such an international structure. A member of the
British delegation, Harold Nicolson, summed up his feelings on
the eve of the conference:
We were journeying to Paris, not merely to liquidate the
war, but to found a new order in Europe. We were
preparing not Peace only, but Eternal Peace. ... We
thought less about our late enemies than about the new
countries which had arisen from their tired loins. Our
emotions centered less around the old than around the new.
the concepts 'Germany, ' Austria, ' Hungary,
'
'Bulgaria,' or 'Turkey' were not on the forefront of our
minds. It was the thought of the new Serbia, the new
Greece, the new Bohemia, the new Poland which made our
hearts sing hymns at heaven's gate. ... Bias there was,
and prejudice. But they proceeded, not from any
revengeful desire to subjugate and penalize our late
enemies, but from a fervent aspiration to create and
fortify the new nations whom we regarded, with maternal
instinct , as the justification of our sufferings and of
our victory .^
Put another way, the Allied delegations approached Paris from
a particular world view which wished to right what were
perceived as past wrongs, and which then wished to move on to
an active strategy for the future. bb
b
""Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919 , 31-33. (emphasis added)
bThis in no way means Co imply chat all of the Big Four (Britain,
France, the United States, and Italy) held the same world view, or for that
matter any greater policy agreement. In particular, France wanted to punish
Germany far more than Che other Allies, and the particulars of the. final
settlement weie the subject of intense negotiation. What can be said with
some accuracy, is that the flavor of the Conference was shaped by the
ideology of Woodrow Wilson, and that the unique popuiat prestige of Wilson in
Europe dictated that the Peace would be conducted at least within the
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Concerning those problems which were perceived as an
obstacle to the founding of the new order, how did Allied
leadership at Paris in 1919 fashion strategy, particularly
with regard to the role of East Central Europe? 1,7
An entire generation of current observers, regardless of
political outlook, has been conditioned by the seventy-five
year reality of Soviet Russia to take Marxism-Leninism
seriously - both as a belief system, political philosophy, and
operating method of government. Soviet statehood has forced
policy analysts to examine Communism on its merits; to
critically analyze the intricacies of the dialectic, and to
guidelines of Wilsonian principles, in particular the Fourteen Points.
Wilson proved difficult to resist for other reasons: in particular, the
publication of the secret treaties by the Central Executive Committee of the
Communist government in Moscow on November 22, 1917 had distilled Allied war
aims to a callous calculation of Great fewer politics. Although the secret
treaties were embarrassing in and of themselves, they were even more
dangerous for the Allied governments in that they failed to justify to the
various electorates the slaughter which had taken place by 1917. Jane
Degras, ed. , Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Vol. I, 1917-1924 , (London:
Oxford University Press, 1951), 3-9.
The secret treaties themselves involved territorial compensation to
Italy for joining the Allies, territorial concessions to Romania and Greece,
the partition of Turkey, control of Constantinople and the Turkish Straits by
Russia, a plan by France and Russia to redraw German Borders, and an almost
fantastic secret conference between French, British, and German bankers to
compensate Germany territorial losses in the West with Russian territory in
the East. James Bunyan and H.H. Fisher, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1918,
Documents and Materials , Hoover War Library Publications • No . 3 , (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1934), 242.
Contrast these cynical arrangements to the Four Principles which guided
Wilson's Fourteen Points, and one understands the power that Wilson had over
public opinion: "(1) 'Each pare of the final settlement must be based upon
the essential justice of that particular case.' (2) 'Peoples and provinces
must not be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were
chattels or pawns in a game.' (3) 'Every territorial settlement must be in
the interests of the populations concerned; and not as a part of any mere
adjustment or compromise of claims among rival states.' (4) 'All well
defined national elements shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can
be accorded them without introducing new, or perpetuating old, elements of
discord and antagonism.'" Harold Nicolson, E'eace Making 1919 , 40-41.
'Particularly with regard to the broad strategy process already
mentioned: determining security objectives, formulating a grand strategy, and
application of appropriate policy instruments.
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intellectually accept or dismiss those intricacies. 68 Such
was not the case for the policy makers who assembled at Paris
in 1919 to assess the threat of Bolshevism - the great
unresolved issue at the conference." British Prime Minister
Lloyd George felt strongly that:
Bolshevik imperialism does not merely menace the states on
Russia's borders. It threatens the end of Asia and is
near to America as it is to France. It is idle to think
the Peace Conference can separate, however sound a peace
it may have arranged with Germany, if it leaves Russia as
it is today. 70
Active Western opposition to Bolshevism had originally
occurred within a wartime context, and was subject to all of
the distortions and propaganda excess such a context
implied. 71
b Which is Co say that practical application goes furthest to
distinguish Marxism from the long and respected line of Western Utopian
philosophers. Famous examples include Sir Thomas More's Utopia , from The
Works of Sir Thomas More , 1557, as well as the works of the prominent
socialist Utopians of the nineteenth century: Count Henri de Saint-Simon,
Charles Fourier, Robert Owen, and Louis Blanc. Joseph R. Strayer, et al, The
Mainstream of Civilization Since 1500
,
386, 585-586.
b Arno J. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and
Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918-1919
,
1967, p. 285.
°Comment made in a memorandum of March 25, 1919. E. Malcom Carroll,
Soviet Communism and Western opinion J919-1921
,
Frederic B.M. Hollyday, ed.
,
'Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1965), 4.
The contemporary view of a German Empire five-thousand miles in width
seems rattier quaint in light of the previous forty- five years of Soviet -
American superpower dominance; it was less so to those at the time,
especially when one keeps in mind that one-hundred million Europeans directly
ruled four-hundred million in the assorted colonies and dominions, that Great
Britain, for example, had just concluded fifteen years previously a war on
the Cape of Africa under the imperial slogan "from Capetown to Cairo," which
served to guarantee access to a British-controlled Indian subcontinent, and
foi that matter that the entire -ontinent :>f Africa had been divided among
the Great E'owers in the short period from 1876 to 1912. Thomas Pakenham, The
Gciamble for Africa - the White Man'.; ;'onoue:-;t of the Dark Continent from
137 6 to 1912, (New York: Random House, L991), y.xi-xxv.
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The Bolshevik threat did not recede with the Armistice,
however, in part because Western perceptions of the nature of
the Bolshevik threat had become more crystallized - more
clearly in tune with possible domestic political implications
.
These domestic implications revolved around the fear and
distaste of what was seen as a growing conglomeration of
spreading revolution, sanctioned illegality, and repressive
tyranny. 72 Bolshevism was less an idea to be feared in
Accordingly, Western policy maker feared Bolshevik gestures which seemed
consistent with German victory. In light of WWII realities, this Bolshevik-
German link also seems strange, except that the Germans had introduced Lenin
into Petrograd with the understanding that he would remove Russia from the
War. 'The aims of the Imperial Government nd of the left wing of the Russian
revolutionaries coincided to a high degree. The willingness of this
government to grant favors may have, on occasions, exceeded the willingness
of the revolutionaries to accept them. ... A socialist revolution was the
(Bolsheviks') aim. To achieve and further it they were prepared to use every
means. Z.A.B. Zeman, Germany and the Revolution in Russia 1915-1918,
Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry / (London: Oxford
University Press, 1958), x-xi, 25-35. Once in Russia, the Bolsheviks did
everything in their power to weaken the Imperial Army, hasten the German
advance, and thus topple the regime in power. Richard urland Atkinson
"Watching the Russian Army Die," Harper's Magazine , October 1918, 618-631.
The public flavor of the times is perhaps best expressed by such
contemporary New York Times editorials as "Surrender Russia and Lose the
War," in which the following phrases can be found: "Berlin to Tokio! Nothing
less is involved in the swift absorption by Germany of Russia," and "...we
shall be giving Russia over to Germany. and to give Russia over to Germany
means to give the future of the human race over to Germany." 3 June 1918,
p. 10:1. Another example in the New York Times is an article by American war
photographer Donald C. Thompson titled: "Lenine Ant i -American as Well as Pro-
German." 18 November 1917, p. 8:1.
These press perceptions were mirrored by government policy makers, and
were not helped by the incredible level of incompetence by Western reporters
and officials in Russia. For a good description of this incompetence, see
Philip Knight ley, The Fust Casualty; from Crimea to Vietnam: the War
Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist, and Mvth Maker , (New York: Harcourt
Brace & Jovanovich, 1975) , 137-170.
War-time fears prompted a series of Allied interventions on Russian
soil, ostensibly to protect Allied supplies from the Germans, which by 1919
involved three-hundred thousand Western troops. Details of the intervention
can be found in W. Bruce Lincoln, Red Victory , 163-193.
Of the three, by far the most dangerous, and thus the idea that
garnered the most consensus from the Big Four at Versailles, was revolution.
This fear was compounded by the fact r ict Lve (although at the time, not
Marxist) revolutions in China and Mexico. Frank Cost ig 1 iola , Awkward
Dominion: Ame;.i::an Political, Economi;-, ..-in! Cultural Relations with Europe,
1919-1933
, 1984, 32-33. The revulsion .it illegality was peculiar to Wildon,
but important because of American post-Wai financial strength. Wilson
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philosophic repose (in a way that a later generation would
fear Godless Communism) , but rather (because of its appeal to
the potential disaffected within domestic working
populations), in action - a violent, irrational, anarchic,
lashing spasm to be contained quickly by an emotionally
exhausted West concerned with rational, ordered legality.
Of grave concern to Western leadership was the headless
transmission mechanism of this dangerous Bolshevik idea, with
its ability to bypass (or for that matter to infect) armies
and governments. 73 Whole societies were vulnerable if not
shielded. Furthermore, Western leaders feared the Bolshevik
idea for its potential, for its ability to grow into a
believed in Che political realm as civilized man's highest activity, and the
rule of law as its proper expression. Lenin's decree of 22 November 1917
which effectively outlawed law (and replaced it with "revolutionary
consciousness") was an example of the sort of Bolshevik measure that Wilson-
equated with social anarchy. Pipes, D., The Russian Revolution , 1990, p. 797,
and Mayer, pp. 19-22. The fear of tyranny was consonant with Wilson's
Fourteen Points and a just completed war to save democracy. As the structure
of Eastern Europe was solidified over the next couple of years, the inherent
inconsistency between the forces of social anarchy (revolution and
illegality) and the forces of autocracy became more and more difficult to
reconcile, and Western planners increasingly began to support the latter.
Wilson's views of Bolshevism were supported by Senator Lodge
(isolationist head of the Foreign Relations Committee) who characterized the
Bolsheviks as a band of "anthropoid apes," whose brand of anarchy, if
"permitted to spread through Western Civilization," would cause "that
Civilization to fall." quoted in Mayer, p. 334, from Congressional Record ,
65th Congress, 3rd Session, Senate, December 21, 1913.
"This fear was far from groundless. The Bolsheviks themselves fully
expected that the Russian Revolution would set of similar upheavals in the
rest of Europe, particularly in Germany, and that a belt of socialist states
would be formed. The formations of soviet republics in Hungary and Bavaria
in 1919 was assisted by Moscow through the Second Comintern- Jonathan R.
Adelman and Deborah Anne Palmier i, Tjit l)v:i.iiii ics of Soviet Foreign Policy
,
(New York: Harper & Row, 1989), 43-47 Also Adam B. [Jlam, Expansion and
Coexistence, Soviet Foreign Policy 19 17-197.-.
,
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, Inc., 1974), 111-125.
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central, rather than peripheral concern. 74 Regarding the
view of Bolshevism held by many Americans in particular,
The Bolsheviks . . . were consistently characterized . . .
t
as
idealistic to the point of fanaticism; as doctrinaire,
impractical, irresponsible, naive. ... It was not as
communists that they were approved of or despised . . .
References to Bolshevik 'tyranny' ... were referring to
the tyranny of 'the mob.' 7 '
All this is not to say that the Allies did not try to
include some sort of Russian delegation within the confines of
the Peace Conference, or to directly affect the events in
Russia through means other than the armed intervention then
taking place, and it was only after exhausting a number of
different initiatives that the course subsequently embarked
upon was chosen. 713
4There was some debate over how best Co counter Bolshevism's threat to
the West. Central to this debate was the perception of transmission
mechanism. Herbert Hoover in a letter to Woodrow Wilson concerning the
Nansen Plan for humanitarian food aid stated the problem succinctly: "There
remains . . . one more point to be examined, that is whether the Bolshevik
centers now stirred by great emotional hopes will not undertake large
military crusades in an attempt to impose their doctrines on other
defenseless people. ... it seems ... that the whole treatment of the problem
must revolve on the determination of this one question." dated March 28,
1919. Arno J. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking
, pp. 2 5-26. John
M. Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism, and the Versailles Peace
,
(Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1966), pp.39- 1
"Christopher Lasch, The American Liberals and the Russian Revolution ,
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 128-
The Allied delegations pursued five different initiative toward
solving the Russian problem at the Paris Peace Conference. First,
invitations were extended to the warring factions to meat at a conference on
Prinkipo Island in the Sea of Marmara. Secondly, Winston Churchill tried to
increase Allied involvement in the intervention so as to soften the Bolshevik
position. Thirdly, William C. Bullitt, secret diplomatic agent on behalf of
the British and American governments was sent on a mission to Moscow to talk
to the Bolshevik leadership. Fourth, Herbert Hoover planned to coerce the
Bolsheviks through the offering :>f fo< I is part of the Nansen Plan,
finally, the Allies tried to politically mite the various White Tactions
under an umbrella of Western liberal democracy. All of these initiatives
failed. George F. Kennan, Russia and the wpst, 121-122.
53
Western understanding of the essential political nature of
the threat produced a three-pronged plan of limited and brief
military activity, broad political support for nominally
democratic regimes, and social/ technical assistance to combat
adverse living conditions. Military activity can be dismissed
rather quickly, because it lasted the least amount of time,
produced the greatest opposition among domestic electorates,
and furnished the most meager results. 7 ' The overall plan
(halting and ad hoc as it was) came to be known as the policy
of cordon sanitaire.
The political component of cordon sanitaire demanded
Western support for a series of East. Central European regimes
newly formed around Wilsonian national principles, and Western
animosity to an old international order which Wilson in
particular considered a source of Bolshevik discontent ("a
protest against the way the world had worked" 78 ) . By far the
At the height of the intervention, the Americans had ten-thousand
troops on Russian soil (almost equally split between the Archangel and
Siberian fronts), the British had one-hundred and forty-thousand troops
(mostly in the Baku and Caspian Sea area), and the French had one-hundred and
fifty-thousand troops (spread out in Poland, the Ukraine, and the Crimea).
These forces were hampered by several things, most noticeably the unexpected
efficiency of the Reds, the incompetence of the Whites, the desire
'particularly in Britain and France) to bring the troops home at the end of
the war, and a series of military mutinies (particularly among the British
and French troops in south Russia). W. Bruce Lincoln, Red Victory , 163-193,
Arno J. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking , 602-603, Philip
Knightly, The First Casualty
,
138-139.
Some policy makers never lost their enthusiasm for the prospects of
intervention, principal among them being newly appointed Secretary for War
Winston Churchill. Churchill believed that twenty-thousand dedicated and
aware men were sufficient for the elimination of the Bolsheviks.
^Statement from Wilson to his staff while aboard the S.S. George





strongest element of cordon sanitaire involved concerted
remedial efforts against the social underpinnings of potential
Bolshevik sympathy. American Secretary of State Robert
Lansing succinctly stated the policy objective: "full stomachs
mean no Bolsheviks . " 7Q
Although effective in containing the Bolshevik virus, this
policy of cordon sanitaire had unfortunate side-effects for
the fate of East Central Europe in general, and American
ratification of the Versailles Treaty in particular. Western
leaders were forced to acquiesce to many of the territorial
claims of the new states, particularly with regard to
frontiers taken at the expense of a weakened Russia. The two
linchpin states, Poland and Romania, made demands that ensured
overextension and long-term resentments. 80 Only by
satisfying a certain portion of the various nationalist
9Frank Costigliola, Awkward Dominion , 41.
Wilson attacked the social cause of Bolshevism with Herbert Hoover and
the American Relief Administration (ARA) . ostensibly a non-political
organization, the ARA assumed almost dictatorial powers over the old imperial
transportation infrastructures of Eastern Europe. Hoover and his men insured
that all U.S. shipments of grain had prominent American markings - that the
local population was under no illusion that the West, and not Bolshevism, was
the proper course of salvation. Furthermore, the ARA acted overtly to topple
Bolshevik, regimes, most notably by increasing aid to Poland during its
campaign against Russia in 1920, and by elimination of aid to Bela Kun's
Hungarian Bolshevik regime during its brief life and war with Rumania.
So concerned were Hoover and Wilson ovei this relationship between food
and Bolshevism that they aqted to subvert the Anglo-French blockade of
Germany. Britain wished to maintain the blockade as a sure guarantee of
German acquiescence to the Versailles settlement. The French had a more
byzantine design, hoping to use the lure of food to prompt the succession of
various German principalities and regions, thus returning Germany to a pre-
1871 status. Such was the threat of Bolshevism, that Wilson thwarted these
designs. Frank Costigliola, Awkward Dominion
,
j^-SB.
Polish acquisition jf the eastern borderlands has already been
examined. Romania was in the process of annexing Bessarabia (modern
Moldava)
. "Decree of the Council of People's Commissars breaking relciti
with Romania," in Jane Degras, ed
.
, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, 4 0.
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ambitions could the West hope to produce popular regime
legitimacy so important in the face of a threat which did not
move with the path of armies. Unfortunately, once the merger
of political and armed threat was accomplished, the new
regimes were in a poor geopolitical position to counter. 81
A second unfortunate side effect of the concessions
granted to the cordon was the permanent codifying of these
border arrangements under Article X of the Covenant of the
League of Nations. Article X was essentially a compromise
between Wilson's world view (so succinctly stated in the Four
Principles), and the necessity to stabilize East Central
Europe in the face of growing anarchic decay. Article X
effectively made illegal subsequent claims for border
readjustments, and pandered to the national sentiment of
states which had advanced through the treaty (such as Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and Romania) , while incurring the enmity of
those which had not (such as Germany, Russia, and Hungary)
.
The real flaw of this compromise made in favor of stability
3; Arno J. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking, 1918-1919 , 340-
341, 602-603.
Because Che Versailles system which emerged dated from the revolutions
of 1918 which preceded the conference, the system could be said to have "been
created from below by a single overmastering political impulse, that of
nationalism." The Versailles Treaty of 28 June 1919 concerned only Germany,
and affected East Central Europe only so far as it dictated Germany's eastern
borders. A series of what were 'jailed 'suburban' treaties gave legal form to
the new system in East Central Europe: the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye of
September 10, 1919 with Austria; the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine of November
27, 1919 with Bulgaria,- the Treaty of Trianon of June 4, 1920 with Hungary;
and the Treaty jf Lausanne of July 24, 1923 with Turkey. Martm Wight,
"Eastern Europe," 22 6.
Subsequent debate in the U.S. Seriate over the Versailles Treaty really
centered around the associated Covenant of the League of Nations.
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(demanded by the requirements of cordon) over principle, was
that it became a critical stumbling block to Treaty
ratification in the American Senate (was, in fact, the most
contentious issue in that debate) . Failure get American
ratification deprived the cordon of its most powerful patron
within the West, and placed its security fate in the hands of
a France that in the coming years would prove to be less and
less able to provide a believable security guarantee. 82
The creation of the first security phase in East Central
Europe was dominated by the threat of Bolshevism and,
subsequently, by a grand strategy which required "the
delimiting of an eastern frontier for Eastern Europe over
against (a) Russia (which) was at that time considered a
greater danger to Europe than defeated Germany.
"
8; Western
leadership analyzed Bolshevism as principally an internal
domestic threat (instead of an external military threat),
dangerous because of its translation of ideology into violent,
anarchic, revolutionary action. This threat could best be
contained by shielding Western societies behind a series of
buffer states in Eastern Europe which would at the same time
function as a barrier to Soviet Russia and as a counterweight
2 For discussions involving Che ratification battle, see Alice R.
Craemer, "Peace - 1921," Current History , February 1946, 138-139. Elihu
Root, "Letter to Honorable Will H. Hayes Regarding the Covenant of the League
of Nations," American Journal of International Law , March 1922, 591-593.
Arthur S. Link, "Wilson and the '"rear Debate over Collective Security," in
Arthur S. Link, ed
. , The Impact of World War I , (New York: Harper & Row,
1969), 129-147.
83Martin Wight, "Eastern Europe," 240.
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to a weakened Germany. Within this series of buffer states,




Several separate policies made the cordon sanitaire
possible. The first involved political support for the
national aspirations of the affected regimes. This support
issued forth from the Western Allies, who, alone as the
dominant military survivors of the war, were given the project
of drawing the map of Europe and codifying the results.
Secondly, the use of food relief as a blunt instrument by the
Americans encouraged the survival of regimes sympathetic to
the role of cordon, while condemning regimes hostile to
containment of Bolshevism. 85 Thirdly, the continued support
of the French in the face of American political isolation and
British indifference, insured a continued orientation towards
the cordon role. French maintenance of the cordon sanitaire
was guaranteed by treaties of friendship and alliance with
84The Polish conquest of East Calicia had resulted in a common frontier
with Romania. In 1921, Poland and Romania signed a mutual security alliance
against Russia which was to last until the outbreak of the Second World War.
"Together the two Powers, one a Baltic state and the other a Danubian and
Black Sea state, held the neck of Europe against the Bolshevik menace from
the east." Martin Wight, "Eastern Europe," 241.
"Specifically, the ARA's conduct during the Romanian-Hungarian conflict
in 1919 contributed greatly to eliminating any remaining legitimacy of Kun's
successor regime. In general, the fact that Hoover's ARA was meticulous in
ensuring that starving populations understood that America aid alone was
responsible for the relief effort went a long way towards promoting Western
values (sold as a root cause of Western performance) over the values of
Bolshevism.
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Poland in 1921, Czechoslovakia in 1924, the Locarno Pact in
1925, 8b Romania in 1926, and Yugoslavia in 1927.
The Versailles system which was emplaced in East Central
Europe in 1919 was the result of a broad strategy process
which determined security goals in relation to the threat of
Bolshevism, formulated grand strategy through the cordon
sanitaire, and conducted this grand strategy through a variety
of policy instruments, economic, political, and military.
Effective with regard to its primary threat, the cordon
sanitaire was fully realized by a series of treaties which,
according to one analyst, "marked the high point of Eastern
Europe as a political ridge or wall. Thenceforth it was
subject to steady . . . erosion, unwittingly preparing for
German expansion ten years later." 87
B. 1945: STALIN, EASTERN EUROPE, AND THE SECOND SECURITY
PHASE
At the conclusion of the Second World War, his Red Army
firmly in possession of most of Eastern Europe, Stalin alone
among the Allies who had fought against Germany was positioned
to dictate the security structures which would dominate the
8bThe Locarno Pact was che first step in the weakening of Che Versailles
system in Ease Central Europe. A distinction was made between Germany's
western frontier, which was mult ilaterally guaranteed by France, Belgium,
Britain, Italy, and Germany, and Germany's eastern frontier, which was not
guaranteed by Britain. British reticence implied that the German-Polish
border was less sacrosanct, and thus put into question all of the agreements
guaranteed by Article X of the League Covenant. Martin Wight, "Eastern
Europe, '" 2 47 .
37Martm Wight, "Eastern Europe," 247.
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post-war world in East Central Europe. 38 In this position
Stalin was confirmed by numerous Allied war councils,
beginning first with Teheran in November 1943, then with Yalta
in February 1945 89 , and finally with Potsdam in July 1945. 90
For this end, Che Red Army had expended a great: deal of effort.
Beginning in the summer of 1944, much of Soviet military strategy was
oriented towards post-war political desires. In August 1944, Romania
switched sides and declared war on Germany. Despite this gesture, the Red
Army subsequently occupied the entire country. In September 1944, Bulgaria,
which had -been neutral towards Russia, tried to sue the Americans and British
for peace terms. On September 6, the Russians declared war on Bulgaria, and
occupied it before an arrangement could be made with the West. Subsequently,
the Red Army became involved in the very costly battle for Hungary, and
especially for Budapest. In all of these efforts, Soviet forces would have
been better served by concentrating in Poland towards the quick defeat of
Germany. Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence , 3 63-3 64.
Prior to Yalta, on October 9, 1944, Winston Churchill made a trip to
Moscow to discuss the post-war settlement. Eager to limit Soviet gains,
Churchill proposed an agreement on a series of spheres of influence. The
percentages, calculated with no apparent basis in mind, guaranteed a
Russian/British sphere of, respectively, 90/10 in Romania, 10/90 in Greece,
50/50 in Hungary and Yugoslavia, and 75/25 in Bulgaria. Churchill, who felt
immediately guilty over this document which disposed of whole societies as
pawns (in contrast to the lofty ideals of a previous generation of
peacemakers), proposed that the incriminating document be burned. Stalin,
who felt few such feelings, told Churchill to keep the document for himself.
The result of this geopolitical horse-trading was to practically
guarantee for Stalin a dominant position in every country involved except
Greece - either by giving to Soviet Russia the predominant percentage, or by
being unable to overcome the influence of the Red Army occupation where the
percentages were equal. Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence , 364.
9 The central debate in each of these conferences concerned the status
of Poland. Britain and France had gone to war over an alliance with Poland,
and the Polish government in exile 'the London Poles), as well as a
significant number of Polish troops were fighting on behalf of the Allies.
For these reasons Churchill said to Stalin at Yalta that for Britain, "Poland
was a matter of honour: it was for Poland that Britain had drawn the sword
against Hitler." Michael Charlton, The Eagle and the Small Birds - Crisis in
the Soviet Empire: from Yalta to Solidarity , (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1934)/ 16.
Stalin, however, wanted any post-war Polish government to be run by
Polish communists of Moscow's own choosing (the Lublin Poles, soon to become
the Provisional Polish Government) . Much of what was subsequently blamed on
Yalta, the inclusion of the Lublin Poles in the prominent cabinet positions
of the post-war government, was largely decided at Teheran. Adam B. Ulam,
Expansion and Coexistence , 363-383.
Perhaps the single greatest reason for Western acceptance of Soviet
demands was the fear that the tremendous efforts and even greater losses of
the Red Army would lead the Soviets to accept a separate peace with lermany.
In retrospect this fear was poorly founded, but nonetheless it dominated many
of the decisions which led to Western concessions. George F. Kennan, Russ la
and the West, 340.
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Although much criticism was subsequently leveled against the
political leadership which acquiesced to this dominant Soviet
position, circumstances made any other position difficult to
execute, and in fact the West was reacting to a foregone
reality.
In broad terms, the objectives regarding East Central
Europe which the Paris Peace Conference sought to address in
1919 were fairly well known (remarkably so compared to
previous diplomatic practice) . Such was not the case with
regard to the motives which guided Soviet policy in 1945. A
number of both competing and complementary explanations
suggest themselves for the path of subsequent Soviet activity:
first, that East Central Europe provided a springboard for the
expansion of a global Communist conspiracy into Western
Europe; secondly, that East Central Europe was to serve as a
buffer, primarily against a resurgent German military threat;
and thirdly, that East Central Europe was to serve as a
buffer, but primarily against the political threat to regime
survival posed by Western industrial democracy.
Concerning the use of East Central Europe as a highway
into the West, evidence revolves around what Stalin thought,
as opposed to how Stalin acted. An observer close to Stalin
both before and during the war recalled two separate
instincts, one national and the other international: "it is
engraved on my memory that Stalin . . . was not only inspiring
Russian nationalism but was himself inspired by it and
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identified himself with it." 91 Despite this observation,
interpretations of Soviet policy which revolve around the
motive of Russian Great Power chauvinism ignore the further
observation that despite this national urge, Stalin, while he
"did not substantially develop the ideas of Communism,
championed them and brought them to realization in a society
and a state. He (Stalin) did not construct an ideal society
. . . but he transformed backward Russia into ... an empire that
is ever more resolutely and implacably aspiring to world
mastery." 9 ^ The question then was how implacable or resolute
was Stalin's commitment to world mastery (at least in the
near-term) when compared to subsequent activities in East
Central Europe.
Yugoslavia soon provided the test case that determined
which Stalin, the nationalist or internationalist, would
dictate the course of events in East Central Europe. In May
1945, Tito's Yugoslav forces moved into the Italian province
of Venezia Giulia and subsequently invaded Trieste. Efforts
by the Allied commander in Italy to dissuade Tito from this
course proved ineffective, and the prospect of armed conflict
between the Allies and the Yugoslavs over the fate of the
Istrian Peninsula loomed large. Churchill advised Truman to
Milovan Djilas was a Yugoslav Communisc who spent part of Che war in
Moscow, often in direct contact with Stalin. Milovan Djilas, Conversations
with Stalin
, Translated by Michael B. Petrovich, (San Diego: Harvest 'HBJ
Books, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1962), 62.
^Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin, 190.
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halt the movement of troops out of Europe and into the Pacific
in preparation for open hostilities. Although Truman
hesitated in taking this open measure, Tito voluntarily and
reluctantly retreated from Trieste and agreed to an Allied
demarcation line. 93
Three years later, when Moscow and Belgrade openly split
over the issue of the Greek Civil War, both the degree to
which Moscow had been irritated by Yugoslav moves at Trieste
while consolidation in Poland was taking place, as well as the
resulting anger by Yugoslav Communists over the lack of Soviet
support for ideological advancement became public knowledge.
This Soviet stance indicated a preoccupation with
consolidation of Russian gains, rather than an emphasis on
revolutionary expansion. This analysis of Soviet motives was
further supported by the causes of the Soviet-Yugoslav split
itself. Yugoslav support for the Greek Communists (a product
of expansionist motives) against the desires of Soviet policy
(which feared Western reprisal 94 ) prompted Moscow to end
support for the Yugoslav regime. The conclusion drawn from
the Yugoslav example was that Stalin acted in East Central
'Adam B. Ml am, Expansion and '.'oexistence , J 34.
,4
A legitimate fear, subsequently fulfilled by the Truman Doctrine
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Europe from the national motive, and did not plan to use East
Central Europe as a highway into the West. qc'
Concerning the use of East Central Europe as a buffer,
primarily against a resurgent German military threat, Russian
losses in the Great Patriotic War, coupled with the near
consummation of German victory, made the need for a geographic
buffer real, and the desire for such a buffer reasonable.
Especially with regard to the traditional Polish invasion
route, the motive of physical security was felt acutely.
Although the need for a physical buffer provides a good
explanation for Soviet post-war activities in East Central
Europe, it by no means provides a complete explanation,
particularly with regard to the Soviet conquest of Romania,
Bulgaria, and Hungary already mentioned, as well as with
regard to the subsequent political activity within those
particular countries. The path of consolidation in East
J In a conversation co Tito at the end of the war, Stalin admitted that,
"today socialism is possible even under the English monarchy.- Revolution is
no longer necessary everywhere. Just recently a delegation of British
Labourites was here, and we talked about this in particular. Yes, there is
much that is new. Yes, socialism is possible even under an English king."
Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin , 113.
Adam B. ulam. Expansion and Coexistence , 384.
The public face given to this dispute is illuminated by the "Statement
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia on Che
Resolution of the Information Bureau of Communist Parties on the Situation in
the Communist Party of Yugoslavia," June 29, 1948, excerpted from The Soviet
-
Yugoslav Dispute
, (London & Mew York: Oxford University Press 'for the Royal
Institute of International Affairs, 1948), 71-79 in Alvin Z. Rubinstein, ed.,
The Foreign Policy of the Soviet union
, 'Mew York: Random House, 1960), 261-
265.
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Central Europe suggested other than purely military
motives . 96
Perhaps the best understanding of Soviet security
objectives comes from the assertion that like that faced by
his Western predecessors twenty-six years earlier, Stalin's
threat was essentially political, revolved around the peculiar
vulnerabilities of a Russian society too long ruled by
absolute dictatorship, and required the use of East Central
Europe as a buffer, primarily against the challenge to regime
survival posed by Western industrial democracy. This view,
predicated on an analysis that the peculiar circumstances of
Imperial Russia, the Bolshevik coup, the Civil War, and the
subsequent years of Party rule had produced a certain official
paranoia, was summarized by George F. Kennan
:
Now the outstanding circumstance concerning the Soviet
regime is that down to the present day this process of
political consolidation has never been completed and the
men in the Kremlin have continued to be predominantly
absorbed with the struggle to secure and make absolute the
power which they seized in November 1917. They have
9bJan Van Oudenaren, Detente in Europe: The Soviet Union and the West
since 1953
, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), 5-6.
The problems of a purely military explanation are explained succinctly
by Adam Ulam: "Why in their satelites, did the Soviets ruthlessly and
speedily crush all . effective opposition, rather than follow the Finnish
model? Prudence would seem to have argued that a cautious approach, leaving
Poland or Hungary internal autonomy after securing their subordination in
matters concerning foreign policy and defense, was preferable to a policy
that so grated on Western sensitivities and that made inconceivable that
technical and financial aid from America which was so badly needed by the
ruined Russian economy."
That the flow of Soviet foreign policy was not a product of potential
Western military aggression is further evidenced by the extensive
demobilization following the war. In 1960, Khrushchev released the following
figures to the Supreme Soviet: Soviet mobilization during the war had climbed
from a pre-wai level off 4,207,000 men to 11,365,000 men by 1945. By 1948,
total troop levels in the Soviet armed forces were 2,874,000 men. Adam B.
Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, 400, 403-404.
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endeavored to secure it primarily against forces at home,
within Soviet society itself. But they have also
endeavored to secure it against the outside world."
Despite the very real belief in Communist orthodoxy
(reminiscent of Woodrow Wilson's genuine belief in national
self-determination), and genuine geopolitical concerns,
Stalin, and through him Soviet policy in East Central Europe,
was primarily concerned with regime survival. The greatest
threat to regime survival was exposure of Soviet society to
the dangerous contagion of Western pluralist industrial
democracy. The transmission of the political threat by a sort
of frictional osmosis produced for Stalin the need to shelter
Russian society from casual contact with a dangerous Western
virus . 98
Certainly Soviet conduct immediately following the war
provides ample circumstantial evidence to support this view.
Russian agricultural production, barely recovered from the
impact of collectivization, had been destroyed in the war.
Total industrial production, despite investments made in
Siberia, had been reduced by fifty percent. Russian
industrial effort, geared towards a massive reconstruction
9 George F. Kennan, "Sources of Soviet Conduce," originally printed in
Foreign Affairs , XXV, No . 4 , July 1947. Reprinted in American Diplomacy,
1900-1950
, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951), 111.
* yThis view has some precedent. The principal calculation that led to
Stalin's signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact was the conviction on the part of
Stalin that "any war, fought on Soviet soil, ... in the end would spell
disaster to the regime and to his own personal power." Adam B. Ulara,
Expansion and Coexistence, 400.
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program, required that wartime measures regarding work hours
and worker discipline be maintained in spite of the promise of
prosperity for the population implied by victory. To ensure
that discipline was continued, any exposure to the outside
world which might taint renewed efforts was ruthlessly sought
out and suppressed."
This internal repression took many forms: whole
populations which were exposed to the German occupation were
sent to forced labor camps; Americans and the British were
portrayed in official propaganda as enemies; a campaign
synonymous with Foreign Minister Andrei Zhdanov was conducted
to purify Soviet culture; foreign contributions to Russian
progress were routinely denounced. Added to these measures
was a general worry on the part of the regime concerning the
exposure of millions of soldiers to conditions outside of
99Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence , 401-403.
This need for repression was in pare a response to how growth was
traditionally managed in the Soviet command economy. The post-war
reconstruction wished to mimic the methods and success of its predecessor,
the first five year plan of 1928-1932. Largely successful as a mobilization
scheme, initial industrialization succeeded for several reasons. The
collectivization of agriculture provided a large pool of cheap industrial
labor. Concentration on heavy industry at the complete neglect of consumer
goods production insured that a large portion of wages could be ploughed back,
into capital investment rather than squandered on consumption. The injection
of these high fates of investment into the economy produced a corresponding
explosion in capital growth of ten to twelve percent per year. This growth
was possible largely because of the freezing of living standards at 1928
levels which was further made possible by the willingness of the state
apparatus to brutalize Soviet society.
Post-war reconstruction demanded that not only would this pattern be
repeated (which it was successfully), but that living standards were to be
reduced to below even 1928 levels, at a time when long-term sacrifice raised
the hope of prospierty rattier than continued privation. The need to manage
this hope by restricting it from knowledge of better alternatives was a
central need of the pout -war Soviet regime. A. Bergson, "the Gorbachev
Revolution," Journal of Economic Issues
, October 1987, 31. R. Kellogg,
"Modeling Soviet Modernization: an Economy in Transition," Soy ier Economy ,
April 1988, 36.
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Soviet borders, and the conduct by that regime of renewed
political purges. All of these pieces of evidence "suggest
very forcibly that a decisive factor in the shift of Soviet
foreign policy following the war was the internal one." 100
Soviet understanding of the essential political nature of
the threat produced a social attack on the populations of East
Central Europe, the specifics of which are broadly known. The
complete closing of East Central European societies by puppet
Stalinist regimes, backed by powerful internal political
police forces,' and ultimately guaranteed by the threat of
Soviet military intervention - the overall process of
satellite formation - served as an effective long-term shield,
as a cordon sanitaire in reverse (though of a more sinister
nature for the various East Central European societies, given
the totalitarian nature of the regimes under which they had to
live)
.
100These purges started first within the military, as prominent marshals
were removed to obscure positions. Zhdanov died in 1948, and all of his
supporters were subsequently purged, as were the leaders of the Leningrad
Party apparatus. Adam B. Ulam, Expansion" and Coexistence , 400-403.
Two policies which would come much later indicated that subsequent
Soviet leadership continued to view the Western threat as a political one
a Lined at the Russian society. The first involved Soviet toleration of
limited economic liberalization in Hungary under Janos Kadar la
liberalization contrary to Marxism, and not copied by Moscow). The second
involved Soviet toleration of foreign policy independence by Romania's
Ceausescu (an independence which theoretically could have translated into
Soviet geopolitical vulnerability). In both cases, Soviet toleration seems
.. nave been bought through assurances of political repression and control,
"nis indicates that the essential charactei of the Soviet cordon was in fact
political. Joseph Rothschild, Return to Diversity: a Political History of
East central Europe Since World War II , (New York: Oxford University Press:
1989), 203-204, 163.
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A standard debate revolves around the degree to which
Stalin actually planned the eventual Soviet satellite-ization
of East Central Europe, with some suggesting Western
vacillation as the primary culprit. Perhaps the correct
answer lies somewhere in between: Stalin had a definite
political goal, but that political goal was tempered by
physical security concerns which fluctuated with geography.
This led to a flexible strategy which reflected strong
ambitions for a quick process of political subjugation in the
Northern Tier, and a willingness to temper those ambitions in
the Southern Tier, with the overall process always subject to
calculations of Western response. In this way Soviet policy




Nonetheless, between 1945 and 1948, Communist
administrations completely loyal to Moscow seized power in
Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. The
process in each of these countries progressed through three
identical stages. In the first stage, government was run by
a coalition of Communists and returning exiles, with the
exiles given positions of great public visibility while the
Communist ministers retained the true positions of power. 102
These Communists used the power of their ministries to move




'^Such as the Ministry of Defense which controlled che army, or the
Ministry of the Interior, which controlled che secret police.
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their governments into the second stage. In this stage,
Communist purges removed popular leaders from positions in the
opposition parties, and opposition parties were not allowed to
criticize Communist policy. Opposition could be expressed
outside the government, but not within the government itself.
The third stage was a completion of this process, with
opposition parties completely abolished or, at the very best,
completely marginalized. By 1948 the process of satellite-
ization had been completed in all of East Central Europe
excluding Yugoslavia and Albania. 103
Maintenance of the East Central European buffer required
extensive Soviet commitments, 104 and, when those commitments
failed, active military intervention (the most prominent of
which occurred against the Hungarian uprising in 1956, and the
Prague Spring in 1968) . 10 - These commitments and
103 In Poland, Che initial regime in 1945 was already in Che second
scage. By summer 1945, Romania and Bulgaria were boch in Che second sCage.
Hungary reached che chird scage in spring 1947, as did che lasc hold-ouc,
Czechoslovakia, in February 1948. Czechoslovakia was a unique case, because
Che Soviec Army had withdrawn from ic in December 1945, and che process of
satellite- izac ion required a much noticeable coup againsc che elecced
government. Because this coup was not execuced gradually, in an unnoticed
way common to che other countries, the Czech process signalled one of the
turning points in Western perceptions of Soviet intentions. Hugh Seton-
Watson, The New Imperialism, a Background Book , (Chester Springs,
Pennsylvania: Dufour Editions, 1961), 80-82.
Michael Charlton, Eagle and the Small Birds , 53-54.
4Notably the formation of the Warsaw E'act in 1955 in response to the
joining of West Germany to NAT<>, and the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance, which enforced barter trade arrangements between bloc members.
David L. Clarke, "Some Revelations About the Warsaw Pact," Report on Eastern
Europe , May 3, 1991, 35.
1,jC
'Michael Charlton, Eagle and the Small Birds, 135-136.
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interventions found a systemic expression in 1968, with the
articulation of the Brezhnev Doctrine:
. . . Nobody interferes in the concrete measures taken to
improve the socialist system in the different socialist
countries. ... However, the picture changes fundamentally
when a danger arises to socialism itself in a particular
country. ... the Communists of the fraternal countries
could not allow the socialist states to be inactive in the
name of an abstractly understood sovereignty, when they




What Soviet policy desired was an international recognition of
the Brezhnev Doctrine coupled with the specific desire to
legitimize and make permanent the Soviet gains at Yalta,
particularly with respect to Germany. 107
These desires, coupled with more general strategic designs
aimed at the West, 108 prompted Soviet leadership to seek a
pan-European security conference the fulfillment of which,
beginning in 1954, and acquiring increased urgency by 1969,
10bHarold Russel, "The Helsinki Declaration: Brobdingnag or Lillipuc?"
American -Journal of International Law , 1976, 253-254. Leonid I. Brezhnev,
"The Brezhnev Doctrine, " speech by the Soviet Communist Party General
Secretary at the fifth congress of the Polish United Workers' Party, Warsaw,
November 12, 196 8, Current Digest of the Soviet Press , 20, no. 46, 3-4.
Vojtech Mastny, ed., Helsinki, Human Rights, and European Security, Analysis
and Documentation
,
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1986), 48.
10 Carol O'Hallaron, "Human Rights as Realpolitik: the united States in
the CSCE, " in RUSI and Brassev's Defence Yearbook
,
(London: 1991), 64.
108Post-Yalta Soviet policy pursued up until August 1991 a broad
strategic design. This strategic design intertwined three themes with regard
to European security. The first theme involved the efficacy of an all-
European system, to include nuclear-weapons-free-zones and the simultaneous
dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. A second theme of Soviet strategy
was that peace would be best served through the mutual cooperation of Western
Europe with the socialist community. A third and complementary theme .. is
that American military and nuclear presence in Europe was unwelcome and
damaging with respect to Europe's true security interests, as Moscow defined
them. Discussion by Dr. Yost, NS 4720, October 10, 1991.
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occupied a consistent and prominent position within Soviet
foreign policy. 109 The resulting Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe which met at Helsinki in 1975 was to
have been for the Soviets the systemic fulfillment of a Soviet
conquest concluded thirty years previously:
the creation of a military glacis beyond the Soviet
Union's western frontier. (Which) offered another cardinal
advantage -the insulation of the mass of Soviet citizens
at home from the allurements of the capitalist West, with
its material seductions and its individual freedoms, while




Helsinki in 1975 was the high point of the Soviet use of East
Central Europe as a buffer against the West.
Soviet leadership (like the Western leadership that had
preceded it), analyzed the danger before it principally as an
internal domestic threat, of long-term concern because of the
potential translation of ideology into popular challenge to
the regime. This threat could best be contained by a grand
strategy which shielded Soviet society behind a series of
buffer states in East Central Europe - behind a series of
political satellites. The process of satellite formation was
made possible by political and military support of Stalinist
puppet regimes. Because of the unpopular nature of this
support, the efforts of Soviet leadership required a
sustained, long-term active Soviet political and military
'"Jan Van uudenaren, Decence n\ Euiooe
,
79, 319-320.
lllJMichael Charlton, The Eaale and Che Small Birds, 135
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involvement, which eventually sought international approaval




The formation of both the first and second security phases
in East Central Europe was prompted by a similar assessment of
security objectives, and grand strategy necessary to meet
those objectives. The structures which emerged from each
security phase diverged, however, in the application of
specif ical policy instruments to fulfill grand strategy. This
divergence resulted from the reaction by East Central European
societies towards the extension of hegemony in each particular
phase, brought on mainly by differences in the internal
characteristics of the hegemon itself. The effects of this
popular reaction were to have significant implications for the
fate of each respective phase, and are the subject of
subsequent analysis.
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FROM BUFFER TO HIGHWAY
"The Russians of the tsars as well as the Bolsheviks had
been more odious than the Germans, whom we detest. "U1
The previous chapter analyzed the formation of the first
two security phases in East Central Europe, and from that
analysis managed to sketch a series of rough parallels between
the hegemonic power in each phase, the generic strategy
process, and the subsequent role of East Central Europe within
a larger European security structure. The purpose of this
chapter is to expose further parallels through analysis of the
collapse of the first two security phases, specifically with
regard to the evolving internal weaknesses of the hegemonic
power within each phase, as well as with regard to the role of
East Central Europe as a catalyzing agent in that evolving
weakness. These two factors explain, particularly with regard
to East Central Europe, what one analyst has described as:
the ambiguity of a buffer zone, which may be created as a*
barrier or containing wall, but is liable to be
transformed, by a watershed of power into an extent of
low-lying flats, open to inundation by the floods from
either side. 11 **
uComment by General Smigly-Rydz, chief of che Polish Army, during
talks with French General Gamelin in Warsaw in July 1936 on the possibility
of a Pol ish-Soviet -French treaty against Germany. William L. Shi ret*, The
Collapse of the Third Republic, an Inquiry into the Fall of France in 1940
,
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969), 315.
''-Martin Wight, "Eastern Europe," 207-203.
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A. 1922-1945: THE COLLAPSE OF THE VERSAILLES SYSTEM
The Versailles system emplaced in East Central Europe in
1919 was to have been guaranteed by the Big Four, operating
under the aegis of the League of Nations. The system itself
was to operate as a wall against Bolshevik influence from the
East, as well as a counterbalance to a recovered Germany in
the center of Europe. 113 Support of the small states in East
Central Europe which were the embodiment of this strategy
required that the Big Four cooperate in regional political
initiatives, and contribute willingly assets unique to each
power but necessary for common objectives. When the Big Four
began to disintegrate as a political alliance, it weakened
irreparably the ability of the League to regulate the
Versailles system, and the resolve of individual members to
sacrifice assets for the maintenance of the system in East
Central Europe.
This disintegration transferred the identity of the West
from a group of liberal democracies acting in concert under
Wilsonian international principles, 114 to single countries,
or alliances of countries, often fascist dictatorships, which
11
"France was che chief architect of the dual conception of the new
Eastern Europe. It was the last phase of her tradition of making alliances
in the rear of the Hapsburg or German enemy." Martin Wight, "Eastern
Europe, " 235
.
This is certainly an oversimplification, Out a reasonable one with
regard to East Central Europe. Even though the Big Four had significant
disagreements on specific policy issues, on a broader level they were able to
express a policy coherence which is illustrated by the creation of the
Versailles system itself.
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acted from principles which were the antithesis of Wilsonian.
Consequently, Western hegemony over East Central Europe took
a turn which almost guaranteed conflict with Soviet Russia,
and in turn ushered Soviet troops, and with them Communism,
into East Central Europe. Given this analysis, the cordon
sanitaire of East Central European states performed its overt
purpose remarkably well. The arrival of the Red Army in
Berlin in 1945 proceeded not from an act of Soviet armed
aggression, nor did it proceed from the internal revolutionary
political upheaval so greatly feared by Western leadership
twenty-six years earlier. Communism arrived in East Central
Europe as a consequence of internal political and moral
failure within the West.
The United States was the first to depart from support of
the Versailles system in East Central Europe, by publicly
rejecting the provisions of the Versailles Treaty during
Senate ratification. Rejection of the Versailles system,
coupled with the victory of the Harding candidacy in the 1920
presidential election, signalled the beginning of an American
policy of isolation from European security affairs. 11 ^ This
K
'A number of important caveats need to be made to this common
perception of isolationism. From 1920 to 1922, America fundamentally
withdrew from European affairs, not only at a political and security level,
but with regard to economic aid and financial investment as well. Poland in
particular invited American businesses to invest, believing that this would
create a stake in Poland for American policy makers. Unfortunately, American
businessmen were reluctant to invest in so unstable a region, which many
thought would not long survive. Also, Polish fiscal policies (which
reflected the financial difficulties taking place across East Central Europe)
had resulted in a hyper-inflation which in many ways rivaled Germany's (the
Polish mark in 1919 was begged at the 9.8 to the dollar; by 1922, the rate
was 17,800 to the dollar. This prompted a Wall Street Journal analysis that
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isolation became less complete beginning in 1922, however, as
American policy makers began to become increasingly concerned
about the growing economic chaos in Europe, especially as to
the degree that such chaos affected relations between France
and Germany. 116 Consequently, the Harding administration
embarked upon a policy of economic diplomacy, "a complex
network of commercial and financial relationships that linked
American well-being to the restoration of European stability
. . . while rejecting political entanglements and strategic
commitments in the Old World." 117 Nonetheless, although
American isolation was not as complete as is often portrayed,
isolationism removed from the Versailles system the one power
Poland's fiscal policy could "only be called the finest bid for bankruptcy
ever made by any modern State in Europe with the sole exception of Russia.") .
Furthermore, immediate post-war American policy discouraged foreign loans for
domestic economic reasons.
This situation changed in 1922, when Secretary of State Charles Evens
Hughes called for a new international conference to restructure the
reparations payments schedule of Germany. The result of this conference, the
Dawes Plan of 1924, gave a two-hundred million dollar loan to Germany against
her war debt. This loan effectively returned American policy to a presence
in Europe, acting through the economic policy instrument. Neal Pease Poland,
the United States, and the Stabilization of Europe, 1919-1933
,
(New York:
Oxford University Press, 1986), 14-25.
l0Thi3 concern prompted even such a staunch isolationist as Senator
Borah to Comment that "we are drifting, drifting, while the most serious
conditions the world has ever experienced are calling for bold and determined
action. ... We are verging ... upon another World War, and even if it does
not result in war, it will result in such utter economic chaos as would have
a more destructive effect upon civilization and upon peoples than war
itself." Melvyn P. Leffler, The Elusive Quest - America's E'ursuit of
European StaPxlity and French "e'-uritv, 1919-193 3 , (Chapel Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 41-42.
117Melvyn P. Leffler, The Elusive nuest, 79.
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The second of the Big Four to depart from support of the
Versailles system, 1101 also for domestic political reasons,
was Italy. The liberal government which had entered Italy in
the war on the side of the Allies in 1915 was a picture of
apparent stability framed by a host of destabilizing
influences. 120 These destabilizing influences proved
irresistible when coupled with the disappointments incurred by
the Italian delegation at Paris. 1 - 1 The combination of
118Economic diplomacy found its greatest obstacle in French policy,
which often included high tariff barriers, was ill-disposed to adjusting
reparations payments based on the German ability to pay, and which continued
to spend what the Americans considered to by unjustifiably high amounts on
defense expenditures. In this way, American policy weakened the Versailles
system further, by discouraging a French military posture which would make it
effective (especially in the absence of any matching commitments from the
other powers)
.
In another sense, however, economic diplomacy was a godsend to the
Versailles system, if only because it was better than no involvement at all.
The failure- of economic diplomacy is the subject of subsequent discussion,
but it opened the door to German penetration in East Central Europe. Melvyn
P. Leffler, Elusive Quest , 81.
119 Insofar as support implied a unified view of security issues in East
Central Europe as defined by France.
1 In the two decades prior to the war, three distinct challenges had
presented themselves to the Italian liberal state. The first was the working
class movement, especially virulent in the north. The second was the
nationalist movement, which wanted to restore Italy to the status once held
by the Roman Empire. The third was the futurist movement, closely linked to
the nationalists, which disdained Italy's antiquarian past in favor of a
modern industrial state. -James Joll, Europe Since 1370, an International
History
, 3rd Edition, (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1973), 126.
1 x Italian nationalism was adamant in completing the process of
unification which had reached fruition in 1868. This unification involved
recovery of all of the Italia Irredenta populations within the Italian state.
These irredentist populations were primarily in Trent ino, Trieste, and the
Dalmatian coast. Furthermore, Italian policy wished to secure a strategic
frontier along the Brenner Pass by annexing the South Tyrol (or Alto Adige as
the Italians called it).
Towards these goals the Italians signed the secret Treaty of London on
May 23, 1915, with Britain, France, and Russia. The treaty promised Italy
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wartime suffering and peacetime disappointment, not only-
removed from Italian politics a government inclined to support
the Versailles system in East Central Europe, but in its place
created by 1924 a Fascist state in active opposition to both
the Versailles settlements and the French influence in East
Central Europe necessary to the functioning of those
settlements . 122
The British also withdrew to a certain degree from
commitments to maintain the Versailles system in East Central
Europe, although British disengagement was less a domestic
reaction to the lack of concessions gained at Paris (such as
in the Italian example)
, or to constitutional issues of
national sovereignty (such as the American example) , but
rather a more complex combination of divergent policy goals,
economic decline, and national malaise. In the first
its claims in the South Tyrol, Trentino, and Dalmatia.
Italian conduct in the war was poor, and with the defeat at Caporetto,
Italy was almost knocked out of the fighting. Suffering was on a massive
scale, with war dead numbering around seven-hundred thousand. Because of
this sacrifice, the Italian delegation at Versailles, led by Prime Minister
Orlando, fully expected territorial gains both in the Balkans and in the now
defunct ottoman Empire commiserate with Italian losses.
Woodrow Wilson, who was appalled at the London Treaty, refused to grant
Italy any gains other than those already promised, and after bitter
negotiating sessions, tried to go over Orlando's head with appeals directly
to the Italian people. The Italian delegation stormed out of the Conference,
and Orlando's government resigned. This incident marked the beginning of a
growing period of instability in" Italian politics, which when coupled with
those forces already critical of the liberal state, paved the way for
Mussolini. James Joll, Europe Since 1370
,
204, 264
122Mussolini actually came to power on the night of October 29, 1922,
when he was asked to form a government in lieu of a 'March on Rome' and coup
d'etat. Mussolini was unable to construct the Fascist state until 1924, when
a new electoral law helped the Fascist party to gain a large majority in the
Italian Parliament. This process was completed by November 1926, when.
opposition deputies were formally divested of their seats. From this point
on, Mussolini was able to use what he called 'our fierce totalitarian will'
in 'making the nation Fascist'. James Joll, Europe Since 1370 , 268.
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instance, British opinion quickly came to consider that the
terms of the Versailles peace had been unduly harsh, and that
future prospects of stability hinged more on rehabilitating
Germany than on punishing her. Towards this end the obstacle
was France, and British policy increasingly found itself in
opposition to its French counterpart on a number of other
issues as well. 123
Coupled with this policy divergence was a desire on the
part of the British Foreign Office to concentrate declining
resources on imperial obligations, specifically in India, 124
and in general to conduct colonial policy from a position of
legitimacy rather than coercion. This meant that support for
the Versailles system in East Central Europe was not a
prominent part of British policy in general, and that the
colonial focus which was the centerpiece of British policy
123 In determining the details of the Versailles system, Britain and
France had little agreement. In the war between Greece and Turkey, France
supported Turkey, while Britain supported Greece. France supported Polish
claims in Silesia against Germany, whereas Britain did not. France supported
Polish acquisition of territory east of the Curzon Line, whereas Britain did
not. These disagreements prompted Lord Curzon to comment in 1921 that, "...
the Foreign Office is only too painfully aware that in almost every quarter
of the globe, whether it be Silesia or Bavaria or Hungary or the Balkans -
Morocco or Egypt of Turkey of Mesopotamia - the representatives of France are
actively pursuing a policy which is either unfriendly to British interests
or, if not that, is consecrated to the promotion of a French interest which
is inconsistent with ours." Sally Marks, The Illusion of Peace,
International Relations in Europe 1918-1933
,
Christopher Thorne, ed . The
Making of the 20th Century
,
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976), 34.
1 One of the critical interests groups in favor of this approach was
the British Army, which considered the Continental War just fought to an
aberration, and its real mission to be in the policing of the colonies. The
Irish problem further focussed efforts on colonial issues, as did inter-
service rivalry. The Royal Navy was able to secure the bulk of the defense
budget, which in turn left room for only m small army. The combination ?f
small army and large navy contributed to a strategy of policing the colonies.
Anthony Clayton, The British Empire as a Superpower, 1919-19 3'-) , (Athens: The
University of Georgia Press, 1936), 11-16.
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would itself be given a decreasing share of the yearly
budget. 125 This British reluctance to either agree with
French assessments in Europe, or to back up those assessments
when there was agreement, produced a situation which, when
coupled with the loss of American and Italian support,
demanded that the Versailles system, if it was to be
maintained, would of necessity be maintained by French
hegemony in East Central Europe. 1 "' 13
Throughout the first security phase, the West maintained
its position as the hegemonic power in East Central Europe,
and used this position of preponderant influence to support
the small states in the region as a bulwark against Bolshevik
Russia. By 1922, however, the West was fractured and divided
into competing interest groups, and the spokesman for the West
with regard to the cordon sanitaire was a France backed by
military power. This Western support for the cordon had its
high-water mark in 1927 with the signing of the Franco-
l25 In 1919, British military expenditures were 604,000,000 pounds,-" in
1920 that number was reduced to 292,000,000 pounds, and then to 111,000,000
pounds in 1921 and 1922. Expenditures were increased to 118,000,000 in 1923,
and remained at that level (fourteen percent of the total budget) until the
1930's.
These reductions ware supported by the Ten Year Rule, in which "the
Cabinet forecast that 'the British Empire will not be engaged in any great
war in the next ten years, and that no Expeditionary Force is required for
this purpose'. ... The military commitments of Empire, then, were those
perceived at the time to be the irreducible minimum necessary for its
preservation. ... Full diplomatic support for the League of Nations was
pledged but as it became clear that any enforcement procedure called for by
the League would be heavily dependent on British forces, British governments
became increasingly cautious about any arrangements that might actually




^William L. Shirer,. Collapse of the Third Republic, 137-152.
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Yugoslav treaty of friendship and cooperation. Thereafter,
Western political weakness would erode this position of French
hegemony, and make possible in East Central Europe the
eventual presence of state Communism, against which the cordon
had originally been designed.
Western political weakness revolved around the issue of
Germany, and manifested itself in two distinct ways: as a
political failure to orchestrate international circumstances
and economic conditions in such a way as to fully integrate
Weimar Germany into the Western democratic industrial
community, and as moral failure to confront decisively the
problem of Adolf Hitler, once circumstances had served to
insure the death of the Weimar Republic. It is towards this
second weakness that this analysis now turns, in large part
because of the role of East Central Europe in German
expansion. The failure to contain German expansion in East
Central Europe is really the story of the weakening of French
hegemony in that region, first in the Southern Tier by Fascist
Italy, and then in both the Northern and Southern Tiers by
Nazi Germany.
Within East Central Europe were roughly three security
groupings: the 1921 Polish-Romanian defensive alliance against
Russia, the Little Entente of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and
Romania against the revisionist claims of Hungary, also signed
in 1921, and the Balkan Entente of Greece, Yugoslavia, and
Romania against the revisionist claims of Bulgaria, which was
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finally signed in 1934. All of these agreements were assured
by French assistance treaties supported by French hegemony.
If Polish diplomatic realities had historically been held
captive to the geopolitical ebb and flow of Germany and
Russia, so also had been the influence on the Danubian and
Balkan states to that of Russia and Austria-Hungary. With the
temporary decline of Russian influence in 1918, and the
simultaneous collapse of Hapsburg power, Fascist Italy looked




Subsequently, Italian policy involved itself in four
objectives
:
the extension of virtual protectorate over Austria in the
north and Albania in the east; the isolation and
disruption of Yugoslavia, which was not only contiguous
but also the strongest of the Balkan powers, by formenting
the Croat question in the north and the Macedonian
question in the south; the support of the revisionist
Powers, Bulgaria and Hungary; and consequently opposition
to Yugoslavia's ally France as dominant Power in Eastern
Europe. 128
The success of Italy in pursuit of these goals would weaken
the French position in East Central Europe so as to prepare
the way for Germany.
In pursuit of these four broad themes, Italy conducted
policy by means of overt diplomacy, secret initiatives, and
illegal measures designed to circumvent the treaty
127Marcin Wight:, "Eastern Europe," 243-249.
28Martin Wight, "Eastern Europe," 252. (emphasis added)
83
restrictions of the Versailles system. 12 " In 1926, Mussolini
was able to politically cement his Fascist vision by divesting
opposition delegates of their seats in the Italian Parliament.
Soon after, he revealed the character of the coming Italian-
French rivalry in East Central Europe by rejecting a French
proposal for a tripartite treaty of friendship and security
between France, Italy, and Yugoslavia, which had as its object
the stability of the Balkans. In place of the French
initiative, Italy concluded a treaty of friendship and
security with Albania in 1926, no with Hungary in 1927, m
and with Turkey and Greece in 1928. n2
There was a momentary attempt on the part of the Balkan
states to halt the divisions created by Italian-French
Rivalry, and between 1930 and 1933, Turkey, Greece, Albania,
Bulgaria, Romania, and Yugoslavia formed an unofficial Balkan
Secret measures involved Italian (and subsequently Hungarian) support
for terrorists organizations which would destabilized French allies. The two
most prominent terrorist groups were the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary
Organization (IMRO), which was based in Bulgaria (like Hungary, one of the
revisionist powers who opposed French support for the Versailles border
settlements, and which use IMRO as a tool of revision against Yugoslavia),
and the Croat Ustasa based in Yugoslavia. In 192 9, the tJstasa and IMRO
united in a political alliance, and the head of the two organizations, a man
named Pavelic, planned subsequent operations from either Italy or Hungary.
A.critical element of the Versailles settlements had involved armaments
restrictions against the former Central Powers: Germany, Austria, Hungary,
and Bulgaria. In 1928, Italy was discovered to be running guns to Hungary
(the Szent Gotthard Incident), and in 1933 to Austria (the Hirtenberg
Incident). Martin Wight, "Eastern Europe," 253.
°A treaty very much on Italian terms, which in effect amounted to a
loss of Albanian sovereignty over foreign affairs.
i A treaty which led to Yugoslav membership in the Little Entente.
'"In 1927, Italy st reng-thened her hold on Albania by signing s treaty
of mutual defense. Martin Wight, "Eastern Europe," 253.
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Conference which met yearly. The inability of Bulgaria to
relinquish revisionist claims destroyed any chance at a trans-
Balkan treaty, and the subsequent formation of the Balkan
Entente in 1934 excluded Bulgaria from membership. This gave
to the Balkan Entente the same anti-revisionist flavor as that
of the Little Entente (directed against the revisionist claims
of Hungary) , and left in place in the Southern Tier an
excluded small power whose grievance could be exploited by any
Great Power wishing to challenge the status quo. 133
1933 was the apogee of French hegemony in East Central
Europe, as well as the high-water mark of Italian opposition
to that position. In February, fourteen days after Hitler
assumed power in Germany, the Little Entente signed a Pact of
Organization which codified in perpetuity all bilateral treaty
obligations (which is to say treaties of friendship and
security with France)
,
and which set up a Permanent Council of
Foreign Ministers to coordinate foreign policy and defense
issues. In March of that year, Mussolini proposed the Four
Power Pact, which would replace the French position in
bilateral treaty obligations with a grouping of Great Powers
(Italy, France, Britain, and Germany) in which France would be
a minority member. 1 ' 4 The Four Power Act as it was proposed
Martin wight, "Eastern Europe," 254.
The Four Power Ace was to pursue a two-part program: to promote the
revision of the peace treaties, and to recognize over time a position of
equality in armaments to all of the revisionist powers - Bulgaria, Hungary,
Austria, and Germany. Martin Wight, "Eastern Europe," 256.
would have been the logical conclusion of Italy's program of
gathering prestige, revision of the Versailles system, and
rivalry with the preponderant French position. Although
France was able to gut the key Italian provisions of the Act
that finally was signed in June 1933 (forcing Italy to settle
for consolidating her influence on the revisionist states in
East Central Europe) , the French position was weakened, and
the precedent for a concert of Powers which would dictate
policy five years later during the Czech Crisis was
established. 13?
The second element which contributed to the inability of
the West to solve the German problem was the growing impact of
the economic World Crisis, ushered in by the collapse of the
American stock market in 1929, which was to have serious
repercussions in the French ability to maintain the cordon
sanitaire in East Central Europe. Poland, Hungary, Romania,
Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania were agricultural societies
between the wars, with Poland, Hungary, and Romania dependent
''The final ace in the French-Italian rivalry occurred in October 1934.
Italy had expended a great deal of effort in establishing influence over
Austrian domestic affairs, even going so far as to mobilize four divisions on
the Austrian border and to threaten invasion during the Nazi putsch of that
year. Yugoslavia, which feared Italian encirclement (through positions in
Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Albania), announce that she too would invade
Austria if the Italians crossed the border. France wished to broker an
agreement between, the two parties, and towards this end the Yugoslav King
Alexander sailed to Marseilles to deliver a message to the French Foreign
Secretary Barthou in October. In Marseilles, King Alexander was assassinated
by a Bulgarian member of IMRO who had trained in Hungary, and who operated
according to a plot organized by Palevic in Italy. Italy refused to
extradite Pavel ic to Yugoslavia. France, which feared growing Balkan
instability, by secret agreement pressured the Yugoslav government not to
publicly condemn Italy. Martin Wight, "Eastern Europe," 257.
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on net exports of grain for economic survival. Unfortunately
for these countries, the liberal democracies in the West were
unable for different reasons to erect consistent policies to
relieve this East Central European agricultural surplus. 136
This inability to export a fundamental economic commodity
was softened by the American policy of economic diplomacy.
Economic diplomacy in turn depended on an atmosphere of ever
increasing prosperity and the subsequent continued creation of
a large market for foreign goods. As long as prosperity
continued, American foreign policy could be dissuaded from a
collision course with competing domestic priorities. The
collapse of the stock market in 1929, and the fall into
economic depression completed by 1932 fundamentally changed
this political calculus so that domestic political
considerations would increasingly override the underlying
elements of the economic diplomacy of the 1920 's. This
process was only accelerated by the belief that the security
crises of a decade earlier had receded, so that by the 1930 's
"American officials felt less pressure to take risks in behalf
of European stability." 137
bThe Americans were themselves net agricultural exporters; the French
were agriculturally self-sufficient, and, because of a strong domestic
agricultural lobby, felt constrained to do nothing; Britain, in accordance
with her colonial policy, had cemented at the Ottawa Conference in 1924 a
system of favorable intra- imperial agricultural tariffs which provided for
all of her needed food imports. Martin Wight, "Eastern Europe," 22^.
u7Melvyn P. Leffler, The Elusive '.mest; 193.
The World Crisis revealed French support for the cordon
for what it was: a series of diplomatic initiatives not backed
by any fundamental economic relationship between the
principals involved. As the 1930 's were to continue, the
small states of East Central Europe would uncover greater and
greater difficulty in adhering to commitments which did not
alleviate domestic hardships, especially when alternative
commitments were made available. Thoughout the 1930 's, Nazi
Germany proved willing to supply such an alternative economic
commitment
.
The centerpiece of Weimar foreign policy had for twelve
years been an entente with Soviet Russia. 138 The creation of
the Nazi state in 1933, however, signalled and end to this
policy, and in so doing began a process of diplomatic upheaval
which quickly dismantled the elements of the French-controlled
Versailles system, and subsequently substituted Germany as
138This entente was codified by the Treaty of Rapallo. In 1922, Lloyd
George chaired a summit conference in Genoa to discuss economic
reconstruction. At this conference German Foreign Minister Walter Rathenau
and Soviet Foreign Minister Georgii Chicherin met alone and concluded a
series of agreements on financial debts, expanding economic ties, military
cooperation, and German technical aid. These agreements ended the isolation
of the two greatest revisionist powers excluded from the Versailles system.
Rapallo paved the way for German military treaty violations, (conducted in
secret on Soviet soil), and gave the Soviets a diplomatic bargaining position
in Europe which hitherto they had not possessed. As such, Rapallo was -the
first manifestation of the Western political inability to solve the German
question: the failure to orchestrate international circumstances and economic
conditions in such a way as to fully integrate Weimar Germany into the
Western democratic industrial community. Jonathan R. Adelman and Deborah
Anne Palmieri, The Dynamics of Soviet Foreign Policy , 61.
George Kennan described the Soviet succes at Rapallo in the following
way: "one part Soviet resourcefulness and singlemindedness of purpose; two
parts amateurism, complacency, and disunity on the part of the West. It is
not the last time, in examining the history of Soviet foreign policy, that we
shall see this recipe play a part, as the Soviet government advances from the
initial weakness of 1921 to the pinnacle of power arid success it occupies in
the wake of World War II." George F. Kennan, Russia and the West, 212.
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Western spokesman in East Central Europe. In replacing French
hegemony with Nazi German, German diplomatic initiatives
placed the security fate of East Central Europe in the hands
of a Western hegemon intent on eventual military confrontation
with Soviet Russia.
This touchstone of this diplomatic upheaval in East
Central Europe was a Poland of two minds about the phenomena
of Naziism. In 1919, Poland had pursued an immediate post-war
policy of border settlements which at once placed it in
opposition to Germany and Soviet Russia. For this reason
Poland had looked askance at the Rapallo accords uniting these
two hostile revisionist powers. This Polish nervousness had
made easier the task of acquiescence to French demands, made
under the aegis of a French security guarantee, for
rapprochement with Poland's immediate East Central European
neighbors, in particular Czechoslovakia. 139
Such a rapprochement was not to Poland's liking, and she
accepted it with barely concealed reluctance. Another
characteristic of the Polish regime was a greater hatred of
Russia - Imperial or Soviet, than of Germany - Imperial,
Republican, or 'Fascist.' 4 " When France refused to back
Martin wight, "Eastern Europe," 258.
14 This greater antipathy towards Russia over Germany owed its source
to the personal power of Pilsudski, who from 1926 onward had cemented his
position at the expense of the right wing of Dmowski. Previous discussion
has already covered the sources of Pilsudski's personal animosity towards
Russian power. Also, the fact that Pilsudski had come to power by virtue of
a violent coup in May 1926, and that tie subsequently ruled in an
authoritarian manner, reduced foL him the negative attractions of Naziism
89
Polish overtures regarding military actions against Germany in
March and November 1933, Poland felt compelled to sign a ten
year pact of non-aggression with the Nazi regime in January
1934. This Polish-German pact was the first fracture in the
French operation of the Versailles system, and brought Russian
Communism one step closer to East Central Europe. 141
Polish-German alliance freed Poland from her previous
position of restraint with regard to hostility towards her
neighbors, and paved the way for irredentist claims to be made
at the expense of Czechoslovakia. Concurrently, opposition to
Fascism moved Soviet Russia from the position of revisionist
power, to that of a status quo power, and in so moving led to
admission in the League of Nations in September 1934. 142
This legitimizing of the Soviet state made Russia eligible as
a treaty partner in agreements of security guarantee.
Consequently, Soviet Russia replaced Poland as the French
counterweight to an expansionist Germany. This Soviet
position was confirmed by formal Soviet pacts of mutual
which appalled liberal democrats in Che West. Joseph Rothschild, East
Central Europe between the Two World Wars , 55-69.
141Martin Wight, "Eastern Europe," 258.
''Jonathan R. Adelman and Deborah Anne Palmieri, The Dynamics of Soviet
Policy
,
75-77. Also George F. Herman, Russia and the West , 276-286.
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assistance with France on May 2, 1935, and Czechoslovakia on
May 16, 1935. 143
The alliance between Poland and Germany, the subsequent
substitution of Russia for Poland as a French counter against
German expansion, and the codifying of this substitution
through pacts of mutual assistance effectively ended the role
of East Central Europe as a cordon sanitaire against Communist
expansion further into Europe. "With this rearrangement of
forces the political subsidence of Eastern Europe was
accomplished. Instead of a barrier it became a valley,
imperfectly traversed by the ridge of Czechoslovakia." 144
This ending * was cemented by the subsequent German
remilitarization of the Rhineland, French indifference towards
halting that action, 145 and consequent loss of a credible
14 In che fall of 1936, Belgium withdrew from its military alliance with
France. French Premier Leon Blum was led to remark later that, "I sensed
with cruel anguish (that Belgium withdrawal) was a new sign, a new symptom of
the progressive dismantling of all our European positions."
The Franco-Soviet Pact had been long advocated by French military
leadership, but domestic conservative elements had delayed its signing until
the end of an acrimonious domestic political debate. William L. Shirer, The
Collapse of the Third Republic , 313.
144
14 c
Martin Wight, "Eastern Europe," 260
In 1925, Germany had voluntarily agreed to the demilitarization of
the Rhineland imposed by the Versailles treaty of 1919." Germany had agreed
to this provision provided that Germany's western frontier was insured by
multinational guarantee, and that Germany's eastern border would be open to
future revision. The Franco-Russian Pact was called by Hitler an act of bad
faith in pursuit of the promised revision of the eastern borders (the
alliance was seen as a guarantee of Che status quo). Hitler used this
pretext, this violation of the spirit of Locarno, as justification for
remilitarization .
A demilitarized Rhineland had been a key component of French guarantees
in all of her bilateral treaties in East Central Europe because, in the event
of German expansion, France could quickly strike into the industrial center
of Germany. Hitler's move in 1936 effectively eliminated the French
guarantees, by removing the capability of swift punishment for German
expansion. William L. Shirer, The Collapse of the Third Republic, 251-259.
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French guarantee for the security of the small states of East
Central Europe.
Lack of French credibility, coupled with German economic
expansion (made more important by the World Crisis, and the
inability of the Western Powers to absorb East Central
European agricultural surpluses) , initiated a process in which
the small states of East Central Europe progressively sought
to reconcile themselves with the desires of a resurgent
Germany. This process in effect ended French hegemony in East
Central Europe and replaced it with German hegemony; Germany
became the spokesman for the West . Although Poland reversed
her course with the remilitarization of the Rhineland and
renewed her security ties with France, and although
Czechoslovakia continued to depend on French support, the
remilitarization of the Rhineland insured that "even if France
still had the will to help . . . she could not do so except by
a full-scale war against Germany." 1415
The arrival of Soviet Russia in East Central Europe in
1945 resulted not from a failure of the cordon sanitaire, but
rather as a consequence of internal political and moral
failure within the West. Western political weakness revolved
around the issue of Germany, and manifested itself in two
distinct ways: as a failure to integrate Weimar Germany into
the larger community of the West, and as an inability to
faMartin Wight, "Eastern Europe," 263
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confront the problem of Adolf Hitler as successor to the
Weimar Republic. The process within which the West failed to
resolutely confront Nazi expansion began with the fracturing
of the Versailles alliance, and the subsequent placing of
responsibility for maintenance of the Versailles system in
East Central Europe exclusively in the hands of French policy.
This process was continued through the weakening of the
French position by Italian diplomatic initiatives in the
1920 's, and by the growing economic World Crisis in the
1930' s. Consequently, the diplomatic upheaval proceeding from
the Polish-German rapprochement in 1933 allowed the
rehabilitation of Soviet Russia as a status quo power in
alliance with the West against Nazi Germany. Russian
rehabilitation was used as a justification for German
remilitarization of the Rhineland. German remilitarization
produced French security guarantees in East Central Europe
which could only be fulfilled by full-scale war with Germany.
This scenario was subsequently fulfilled by the Czech crisis
of 1938, and the German invasion of Poland in 1939.
With the coming of the Second World War and with the
subsequent defeat of Nazi Germany, the final, physical
collapse of the Versailles system of cordon sanitaire was
completed. The final verdict of this Western internal




Individually, . . . (Germany) could be defeated only if the
democracies had the collaboration of ... (the Soviet
Union) . But such collaboration, if permitted to proceed
to the point of complete victory, would mean the relative
strengthening of the collaborating power and its eventual
appearance as a greedy and implacable claimant at the
peace table. Not only that: any war in which (the Soviet
Union) was fighting on the side of the democracies could
scarcely be fought to a complete and successful finish
without placing the collaborating totalitarian power in
occupation of large parts of Eastern Europe simply by
virtue of the sweep of military operations. . . . we begin
to wonder whether the great mistakes of Western statesmen
in connection with this world war were really those of the
wartime period at all - whether they were not rather the
earlier mistakes, or perhaps we ought to say earlier
'circumstances' - which had permitted the development of
a situation so grievously and fatefully 'loaded' against
Western interests. 147
B. 1989: MORAL COLLAPSE AND THE END OF PHASE TWO
The Soviet system of East Central European satellite
states performed its role as a political/ideological buffer
with callous efficiency until 1989, when, inexplicably, a
series of popular uprisings toppled the aging Marxist regimes
in the region. This collapse of the second security phase was
not caused, however, by a failure of the satellite policy
(despite the apparent progression of discontent from East
Central Europe into Soviet Russia) , but rather because of an
internal, Soviet Russian political failure. The Soviet
political failure revolved around the issue of economic
performance (much in the same way that the previous Western
political failure had revolved around the issue of Germany)
,
George F. Kennan , "World War II," first published in The Review of
Politics
, XII, April 1950, American Diplomacy , 75,77. (emphasis added)
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and also manifested itself in two ways: as the avenue through
which increased Western human rights contact with East Central
Europe Cand from East Central Europe to Soviet Russia) could
be funneled, and as the altar upon which the power of the
Russian Communist Party could be sacrificed.
This essential political weakness 148 allowed the West to
use economic leverage as an entry into greater human rights
contacts with East Central Europe, contacts hostile to the
original political intent of the satellite system. At the
same time, Soviet internal attempts to solve the economic
problem led to a system of glasnost directed at the Russian
Communist Party, the result of which was the gradual but total
dismemberment of Party power. The destruction of Party
prestige removed from the Soviet leadership the critical
constituency (followed closely by the army) upon which regime
survival ultimately depended. The uprisings in East Central
Europe in 1989 which resulted were a product of the turbulence
created by this political inability to solve the Soviet
economic problem.
The Soviet society shielded from contact with the West at
the end of the .Second World War found itself embarked upon a
reconstruction program modeled on that of the first Five Year
Plan of 1928-1932. This traditional Soviet economic
Russian economic problems should be seen as essentially a political
failure, flowing as they did, not from cyclical forces, but from tiie rigidity
of the Soviet economic philosophy.
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mobilization scheme relied for the most part on large
infusions of labor and capital investment to promote overall
growth of gross national product. Industrial labor necessary
for the conduct of the initial Five Year Plan was provided for
out of the personnel surpluses produced by the forced
collectivization of agriculture. 149 In the post World War II
reconstruction, industrial labor was obtained by continued
efforts .at collectivization, by aemobilization of troops, by
conforming the efforts of the existing workforce to wartime
work schedules and labor discipline, and by retaining the
efforts of populations displaced from their homelands by
Stalinist relocation policies. 150
The second ingredient of the economic mobilization scheme
was the requirement of large infusions of capital investment.
Capital investment was accomplished through the concentration
on heavy industry at the complete neglect of consumer goods
production. This concentration insured that a large portion
of industrial wages could be plowed back into capital
investment (through savings forced by scarcity) rather than
squandered on consumption. In the initial Five Year Plan,
this savings versus consumption ratio translated into living
149Colleccivization had on Soviet: industrialization an effect similar
co that of the Corn Laws and Enclosure Acts on British industry one-hundred
years earlier. By industrializing agriculture (placing large tracts under
the management of small numbers of people) , millions were ejected from the
small village environment and made their way Co the cities. This process
provided a large pool of cheap, willing industrial workers.
l
'' For example, the Volga Germans or Che Crimean Tatars or the
Meskhecian Turks. Adam B. '.Ham, Expansion and Coexistence, 402-403.
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standards frozen at 1928 levels. In the post-war
reconstruction, the same approach was employed, but with the
important caveat that living standards were held at pre-1928
levels. In both instances, conformity to the state-mandated
growth policy was insured by the willingness of the state
party and security apparatus to brutalize Soviet society. 151
The injection of a large labor force and high rates of
capital investment into the Soviet economic reconstruction
produced an explosion in gross national product (ten to twelve
percent growth per year) in the immediate post-war years which
corresponded favorably to that produced by the first Five Year
Plan. In the post-Stalin era, however, Soviet leadership felt
compelled to address a critical shortcoming of the traditional
economic mobilization scheme: the disjunction between
industrial production and the new technical revolution guiding
industrial innovation in the West. 1 '"1 From the mid 1950 's
onward, Soviet economic policy would be increasingly
handicapped by the inability to plumb the relationship between
""A. Bergson, 'The Gorbachev Revolution," 31. R. Kellogg, "Modeling
Soviet Modernization: an Economy in Transition," 36.
" 2 Beginning with Khrushchev on, the state apparatus placed increasing
importance on scientific achievement. Unfortunately, this emphasis was
centrally controlled, and although it resulted in such achievements as the
Soviet space program, it could not translate into a general increase in
consumer goods production, or quality goods and services in general. Those
who were a product of the new technical education system were often
contemptuous towards labor, preferring to work within the confines of
academia. Mikhail Heller and Aleksandr M. Nekrich, ntooia in Power, 557.
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scientific breakthrough, industrial productivity, and overall
levels of growth. 153
The relationship between overall levels of growth and
technological advancement is fairly clear: overall growth is
a product of change in labor (dL) added to change in capital
(dK) added to a change in the combination of technology,
efficiency, and resulting productivity (dT) . The relative
weights of each of these factors in the growth equation is
three to one to one in favor of dT, dL, and dK respectively.
In other words, twenty percent of overall growth in gross
national product is a result in growth in labor, twenty
percent is a result of growth in capital, and sixty percent is
a result of productivity factors having to do with technology
and efficiency breakthroughs. Technology and efficiency





"In one of his speeches, the prominent scientist Academician Petr
Kapitsa compared Soviet industry to an ichthyosaur, a prehistoric beast with
a long enormous body and a tiny head; that is a huge industrial apparatus in
which science played an extremely insignificant role." Mikhail Heller and
Aleksandr M. Nekrich, Utopia in Power , 556-557.
lj40ften in developing countries, "output has increased at a higher rate
than can be explained by an increase in only the inputs of labor and physical
capital. ... Although some of this progress may be incorporated in physical
capital, the improvement in intangible human qualities are more significant.
... The characteristic of 'economic backwardness' is still manifest in
several particular forms: low labor efficiency, factor immobility, limited
specialization in occupations and in trade, a deficient supply of
entrepreneurship, and customary values and traditional social institutions
that minimize the incentives for economic change." Gerald M. Meier,
"Investment in Human Capital - note," Leading Issues in Economic Development ,
fifth edition, (New York: Oxford University Press: 1989), 450.
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Despite efforts at limited reform, 1SS the inability of
Soviet leadership throughout the 1960 ' s and 1970 's to grapple
effectively with the human factors of productivity produced a
two-part pattern of economic decline: overall growth rates
fell significantly, as did the ability to produce specific
high-technology products in competition with the West.
Throughout both decades, the classic Soviet formula for high
growth rates (infusions into the industrial labor pool of
large numbers of formerly agricultural workers; capital
investments bought through the scarcity of consumer goods;
both made possible by the heavy hand of the state apparatus)
proved unable to maintain its high initial performance.
Soviet leadership, in turn proved unable to foster the sort of
social and economic environment within which an investment in
human capital would pay dividends. By 1970, overall growth
had declined from ten to twelve percent at the end of post-war
reconstruction, to four to eight percent by 1970, to two-
tenths to two percent by 1985. 1Sb
Towards this systemic inability, this internal political
failure, to creatively and successfully confront the problem
1 "' J In particular, the Khrushchev reforms in education and public finance
were an attempt to tackle the problem of human productivity. These reforms
were often very limited and poorly done. Mikhail Heller and Aleksandr M.
Neknch, 'J topi a in Power , 556-559.
ljbThe 1970 figure still seemed to be pretty high. Compared to former
levels however, growth in the Soviet Union had declined by fifty percent in"
just ten years. It was this trend, this downward movement, which must have
alarmed Soviet leadership. Marshall Goldman, "Gorbachev the Economist,"
Foreign Affairs
,
Spring 1990, 29. "Massed Against the Past," The Economist ,
October 20, 1990.
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of human capital development Soviet policy adopted two
approaches relevant to the collapse of the second security
phase in East Central Europe: a policy of obtaining from the
West whatever high-technologies which were unattainable in the
Soviet economy, as well as general concessions on trade; and,
a policy of economic restructuring to attack the root causes
of the human capital deficiencies. The first approach,
codified in the Basket 2 accords of the Helsinki Final Act in
1975, created the first rent in the political glacis of the
iron curtain. The second approach, formalized under
Gorbachev's program of perestroika in 1986, insured that that
initial rent, once enlarged, could not easily be mended.
Initially, the issue of human rights accords stood little
chance of being placed on the agenda of a pan-European
security conference. The Soviets, who wanted a conference to
codify territorial gains made at Yalta and political gains
articulated in the Brezhnev Doctrine, were very much
disinclined to allow a human rights curriculum to be placed
before the proposed, negotiations. The Americans, in
particular Henry Kissinger, were reluctant to proceed with a
conference at all, and even more reluctant to include human
rights issues in the agenda should such a conference take
place. 15 '' Nonetheless, Soviet urgency for a conference
1
"' To reiterace: post-Yalta Soviet policy pursued up' until August 1991
a broad strategic design. Tins strategic design intertwined three themes
with regard to European security. The first theme involved the efficacy of
an all-European system, to include nuclear-weapons-free-zones and the
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suggested the possibility of Soviet human rights concessions
which might be bought by the West at the price of increased
economic cooperation. It was with full cognizance then, of
Soviet strategic objectives and European desires, that
American negotiators in 1972 participated in preliminary
meetings for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE) to convene in 1973 at Helsinki.
Initial popular reaction in the West, and particularly in
the United States, towards the provisions of the Helsinki
Final Act in 1975 was skeptical at best, and explosively
simultaneous dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. A second theme of
Soviet strategy was that peace would be best served through the mutual
cooperation of Western Europe with the socialist community. A third and
complementary theme was that American military and nuclear presence in Europe
was unwelcome and damaging with respect to Europe's true security interests,
as Moscow defined them. David S. Yost, "Soviet Aims in Europe," Society ,
Vol. 24, No. 5, July/August 1987, 72-79.
Added to these long-term objectives in relation to the West, was a more
specific desire to legitimize and make permanent the Soviet gains at Yalta,
particularly with respect to a divided Germany. Furthermore, the Soviets
wanted international recognition of the Brezhnev Doctrine articulated after
the Czech invasion of 1968. Beginning in 1954, and acquiring increased
urgency by 1969, the search for a pan-European conference on security issues
occupied a consistent and prominent position within Soviet foreign policy.
Caroll O'Hallaron, "Human Rights as Realpolitik: the United States in the
CSCE," 64. Jan Van Oudenaren, Detente in Europe , 79, 319-320.
American policy makers were initially '.-old to Soviet requests for a pan-
European conference, seeing it correctly as an important element in a broader
Soviet strategy - a strategy dedicated to severing American security ties
with Europe. Five things served to change American thinking in the years
between 1968 and 1972: 1) detente had become a centerpiece of Kissinger's
foreign policy, and a pan-European conference was seen as serving detente;
2) at an internal level and in a limited way, Soviet interests in East
Central Europe were increasingly perceived as legitimate by American policy
makers; 3) the increasing Soviet urgency cor a conference could be parlayed
into an agreement on a series of confidence-building measures (CBM's); 4) the
issue of human rights could be used to de-legitimize Soviet claims in Eastern
Europe, or at the very least to change the basis of Soviet legitimacy from a
strictly power correlation, to what one analyst described as a more 'organic'
relationship; 5) the West Europeans showed great enthusiasm for an all-
European security conference, particularly with regard to human rights and
free travel of ideas. Caroll O'Hallaron, "Human Rights as Realpolitik: the
United States in the CSCE," 68. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, "The- Sonnenfeldt
Doctrine," remarks by the counselor to the Department of State at a meeting
of U.S. ambassadors in Europe, London, December 1975, official State
Department summary, The New York Times
, in Vojtech Mastny, Helsinki, Human
Rights, and European Security , 97 .
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negative at worst. The Soviets claimed, and were in large
part believed, to have accomplished all of their objectives
with regard to codifying the post-Yalta political borders in
East Central Europe; also, the Soviets appeared to have gained
sweeping economic concessions from the West at little cost to
themselves; finally, the Soviets achieved these concessions at
the cost of agreeing to human rights accords which were
imprecisely defined, difficult to verify, and impossible to
enforce. Towards each of these objectives, Soviet claims and
Western popular fears of success were overstated: the limited
Soviet victory which proceeded from the Final Act in fact was,
in the long run, counter productive for the continued buffer
role of East Central Europe. 158
The Helsinki Final Act produced accords in three broad
areas called Baskets. Basket 1 involved general principles
and security related issues. Basket 2 dealt with economic,
scientific, and technological cooperation. Basket 3 revolved
around human rights, to include such areas as: "expansion of
human contacts across borders, improvement of access to
printed and broadcast information, improvement in the working
conditions of journalists, and expansion of cultural and
1 '^ Basket 1 - Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe: Findings Eleven Year-- .tftei Helsinki ,
Report to the Congress of the United States by the Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, Vol. 2, November 1936, 4-5.
102
educational cooperation." 1^ Of the three Baskets, Basket 1
issues proved to be the most controversial for Western
politicians, provided the most ammunition for media and
popular opposition, and contributed almost all of the moral,
if not legal or organizational, framework for more recent
understandings about pan-European security. Specifically,
within Basket 1, the statements on general principles provided
most of the backbone for the public debate. lb0
By 1978, however, Basket 2 principles on economic
cooperation had come to dominate the agenda of the Communist
regimes in East Central Europe, had in fact become regarded as
"a basis and at the same time a barometer for detente." 161
159Basket 1 Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, 4
.
160„The most controversial of the general principles were the provisions
on: inviolability of frontiers, sovereign equality and respect for the rights
inherent in sovereignty, and territorial integrity of states. In all of
these principles the Soviets claimed, and the Western press largely believed,
that their long-term strategic desires were fulfilled, with no compensation
to the West, and with no geopolitical costs for the Soviets. In fact, both
Soviet claims and Western press reaction were incomplete and misleading.
Intensive negotiations caused the Soviets to make major concessions in the
language of the principles. For example, the principle of inviolability of
frontiers restricted states from changes made by assaulting frontiers, thus
leaving open issues such as the peaceful unification of Germany, or the
national claims of ethnic minorities. The principle of territorial integrity
was interpreted by the Soviets to restrict outside interference in
ethnic/national agitations; in fact, the West interpreted tins clause
retroactively, and used it to condemn past Soviet territorial acquisition
(such as in the Baltics) . On the whole then the Basket 1 section on general
principles when it did not directly favor Western objectives, only indirectly
favored the Soviet position. Harold Russel, "The Helsinki Declaration:
Brobdingnag or Lilliput?" American Journal of International Law , 1976, 253
254, 249-257, 263, 265. Jan Van nudenaren, Detente in Europe, 3; 327
lbl rThere were three reasons for this: 1) Soviet Russia was urging the
convening of three pan-European 'Brezhnev Conferences' on energy,
transportation and environment. The conference on energy was intended to
create tension within the Western alliance; the conference on transportation
was meant to use Western capital to expand economic infrastructure; the
conference on the environment was to pander to the good will of certain
groups in the West while securing available Western technical knowledge. 2)
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This had two direct consequences for the breaking of the
political barrier of East Central Europe. The first involved
the intangible benefits of intertwining the Soviet command
economy with the market economies of the West through informal
contacts with Western businessmen
.
lb2 The second implication
of this increased desire for Western Basket 2 cooperation was
the opportunity that it afforded Western policy to use
economic concessions as a bargaining chip for greater Basket
3 openings in East Central Europe. 163 These openings allowed
in the 1970' s and early 1980 's the practice of increased high-
level political consultations between individual countries in
the West and their counterparts in East-Central Europe such as
The CMEA members had heavy debts with the West, and thus had a debtor's
interest in further credit. 3) Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia realized
-the necessity of Western aid for modernization. Bettina S. Hass-Hurni, "The
Relevance of Economic Issues at the Belgrade Conference, " intereconomics ,
May-June 1978, 142-143, in Vojtech Mastny, Helsinki, Human Rights, and
European Security , 121-122.
lb2
" Increased economic cooperation necessitates many more direct
contacts between Americans and people of all levels in the East. These
contacts offer those in the East an opportunity to observe the personal
freedoms and liberties which we enjoy, and the effective and efficient
operation of Western trade, industry, and technology in a decentralized and
open economic setting. Although economic cooperation alone is far too weak
an instrument to achieve the economic, political, and humanitarian goals we
seek, such relationships, over time, can contribute importantly to greater
flexibility and more openness in the economic and social systems of the
Communist countries. Elliot L. Richardson, -"Basket Two May Bring Intangible
Benefits," Statement by Secretary of Commerce, Washington, January 14, 1977,
Implementation of the Helsinki Accords , Hearings before the Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, Ninety-Fifth Congress, January 14, 1977
'Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), 94-95, in Vojtech
Mastny, Helsinki, Human Rights, and European Security , 134-135.
b Gregory Grossman, "The Economic Bargaining Chips," Statement by
Professor of Economics, University of California at Berkeley, Implementation
of Helsinki Accords , Hearings before the Commission on Securit and
^operation in Europe, Ninety-Fifth Congress, January 14, 1977 (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), 140-141, in Vojtech Mastny,
Helsinki, Human Rights, and European Security , 13 6-137.
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had not been seen since the implementation of the satellite
system. lb4
Although a causal relationship between the Basket 3
accords and the fracturing of the Soviet political buffer is
difficult to prove, one key peace of evidence in favor of the
impact of the Helsinki Final Act was the subsequent signing in
Czechoslovakia of Charter 77, which became the foundation for
political opposition in Czechoslovakia. Although not a
blueprint for an organization or opposition party, Charter 77
based itself on economic, social, and cultural rights which
"... were confirmed at Helsinki in 1975 and came into force in
our country on 23 March 1976. From that date, (Czech)
citizens have the right, and (the Czech) state the duty, to
abide by them." Signed by fifteen-hundred East Central
European dissidents, including eventual Czech President Vaclav
Haval, Charter 77 represented the sort of systemic rip imposed
on the political fabric of the iron curtain made possible by
the Helsinki Final Act. The Basket 3 provisions of the
Helsinki Final Act demonstrated the sort of concessions which
b4Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, "Political
Relations and Contacts," The Helsinki Process and East -West Relations:
Progress in Perspective : Peoort on the Positive Aspects of the Implementation
of the Helsinki Final Act, 1975-1984
,
(Washington D.C.: Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1985), 3-10, in Vojtech Mastny, Helsinki ,




were required by the growing internal economic-political
weakness of Soviet Russia. lbS
The first approach to the growing inability of Soviet
policy to successfully confront the economic problem involved
increased attempts to secure Western industrial advances,
codified through the Basket 2 accords of the Helsinki Final
Act. This approach produced human rights concessions, which
in turn created the first openings in the political wall
protecting Soviet society from the dangerous contagion of the
West. The second approach involved internal economic
restructuring, and produced repercussions which not only
accelerated the dismantling of the East Central European
buffer, but which removed from the Soviet regime the political
will to restore that buffer once it began to disintegrate.
At the heart of any discussion of perestroika, with its
loose talk of market mechanisms, worker initiative, and
increased productivity, lies a myth that must first be put to
rest: that Gorbachev, when he first instituted economic
restructuring in 1985-1986, intended fundamental change in
either the political control of the Soviet Union, or in the
essential socialist understandings governing commercial
activity. A popular analogy with some Soviet observers is
that Gorbachev and perestroika were to Communism in the 1980 ' s
lb
"'H. Gordon Skilling, Charter n ~l and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia
,
'London: Allen & Unwin, 1981), 209-212, in dale Stokes, ed . , From Stalinism
"o Pluralism - A Documentary History of Eastern Europe Since 1945 , (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1991), 163-166.
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what Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal were to capitalism in
the 1930's: agents seeking improvement within an already
existing . system. Just as New Deal reforms utilized state
solutions to improve capitalism, so too did perestroika
attempt market solutions to improve and strengthen
socialism. lb6
By 1985, despite contacts with the West, the traditional
Soviet economic growth program was still in place. Declining
labor productivity coupled with an aging capital stock coaxed
a rise in net fixed capital investment from seventeen percent
of GNP to twenty-six percent of GNP in the early 1980 's.
Because of the high rate of capital repairs, total capital
investment peaked at thirty-five percent. Predictably, these
investments did not see a corresponding rise in productivity.
Output of machine tools, steel, coal, and petroleum declined.
Overall growth fell to two tenths to two percent. Given that
not only capital but military expenditures as well increased
during .this period, the impact on Soviet standards of living
was severe. Throughout this downward economic slide the key
ingredient of those initial high 1930 ' s growth rates, iron-
fisted government repression and control, remained useless as
a positive stimulus. Some other tool, some sort of carrot,
was required to revive technology, efficiency, and
H. Stein, "Perestroika: Gorbachev's New Deal?" The Wall street
Journal, December 4, 1989, al.
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productivity in order to halt the negative economic
spiral. 167
The initial elements of perestroika were on three
different levels: government bureaucracy, industrial
management, and labor efficiency. All levels of restructuring
attempted to create two very different things: a general
atmosphere (political, social, commercial) conducive to
greater individual creativity and productive effort, and
specific measures designed to take advantage of this new
atmosphere and to channel this increased productivity into
intended areas. 168 In each of these areas, perceived to be
the greatest obstacle to improvement was the continued
stultifying presence of a bloated Party bureaucracy, no longer
revolutionary or particularly Communist, but rather devoted to
continued privilege and prestige.
lb7Marshall Goldman, "Gorbachev the Economise, * 29. "Massed Against the
Past, " 13 .
16 The intended atmosphere was best described as a regulated market
economy by which it was meant that the economy would be nine parts regulated
and one part market. In other words, market mechanisms would be utilized
under ministerial control. At the bureaucratic level, perestroika involved
the coalescing of over seventy-five scattered ministries into a series of
super-ministries such as when the six separate farm ministries were combined
into the giant new State Agro- Industry Committee (Gosagroprom) . At the
industrial management level, correct atmosphere was to flow from the concept
of enterprise autonomy. The five year plans did not disappear, they merely
assumed a more advisory status, a launch point for the more detailed
enterprise level planning. At the level of worker efficiency, perestroika
ensured the workers of their own expandability : the industrial proletariat
could be fired for poor productivity. All of thee measures, in government,
in industry, and in labor strategy hoped to spark greater creativity,
initiative, ami productivity. "Market Bidding," The Economist , April 8,
1590, 43-46. R. Kellogg, "Modeling Soviet Modernization," 38- " E\ Gumbel,
"Moscow Tackles No . 1 Domestic Problem," The Wall Street Journal , October 3,
1989, al3 .
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What followed in the halting footsteps of perestroika was
a concerted attack on the Communist Party bureaucracy through
the instrument of public scrutiny labeled glasnost . Given the
position of the Party as a guarantor of regime survival and
ideological legitimacy, this attack is a curious one with
competing explanations. One theory proposes that Gorbachev
believed that after seventy-two years of the Soviet
experiment, there existed in the Union the idea of the Soviet'
citizen - productive, disciplined, Marxist-oriented. The
bureaucracy of the Party was a burden holding back the
productive efforts of this vast body of Soviet citizens.
Communist social and economic progress then, could best be
pursued not through the activities of- the Party, but through
the efforts of the Soviet citizenry as a whole. 169
There is some support for this analysis of glasnost in the
initial conduct of perestroika. Critical to any discussion of
the atmosphere and productivity which were the goals of
economic restructuring is some understanding of the ultimate
ambition of all the hoped-for efficiency. The average Soviet
citizen, free of the shackle of state interference,
invigorated by the flush of enterprise autonomy, and infused
with a sober, disciplined work-ethic, was meant to utilize his
new technical ingenuity towards enriching the aggregate Soviet
^Kenneth Jowitt, "The Strength and Character of Conservative and
Reactionary Forces," lecture to the conference beyond Leninism in Eastern
Europe and che Soviet Union
, University of California at Berkeley, March .5,
1991.
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economy - an amorphous concept distinct and apart from the
welfare of Soviet society. So while perestroika focused
reforms on supply or productivity, the demand signals for
supply were depressed in two important and mutually supporting
ways: through planning, which continued to support the machine
tool industry at the expense of consumer goods production (a'
la the first Five Year Plan) , and through strict control of
retail prices. Such specific policies were intended to insure
that growth spurred by increased efficiency would benefit
approved, rather than wasteful, segments of the economy. This
ultimate goal in turn assumed a broad population in favor with
the approved targets of increased productivity. Acceptance on
the part of the population implied certain assumptions about




Unfortunately for Gorbachev, the removal of Party prestige
revealed the existence of Russian, Lithuanian, Uzbek, and
other national citizens, but precious little Soviet
citizenship. Once uncapped, however, the genie revealed -by
the attack on the Party could not be easily put back in its
bottle. Glasnost took on a life of its own, with each-
revelation producing demands for new revelations. This
process in turn required of Gorbachev a precarious balancing
act between the public agitation produced by glasnost (itself
"'Marshall Goldman, "Gorbachev the Economist," ii. "When the Price is
Wrong," The Economist:, February 2, 1991, 4 C. .
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a product of perestroika) and reactionary forces within the
Party, the Army, and the KGB. This need to balance his regime
between these competing interests meant that Gorbachev was in
a poor position to respond firmly to the uprisings which
occurred in East Central Europe in 1989, in the breakaway
Baltic Republics in January 1991, or within Moscow itself in
August 1991. m Without discounting the factor of ruling
personality, one can suggest that the constituent damage
wrought by glasnost (itself a problem of economic incapacity)
removed from Gorbachev the personal regime security from which
he might have acted more harshly, and in fact presented him
with a series of choices that he otherwise would not have had
to make.
The collapse of the second security phase was caused not
by a failure of the East Central European buffer to adequately
shield Soviet society from the dangerous virus of Western
industrial democracy, but rather from an internal Soviet
political failure and moral collapse. This Soviet political
failure revolved around the inability of Communist economic
policy to maintain adequate levels of economic growth,
particularly in the field of high technology dominated by
Western industry. Soviet policy at different times attempted
to overcome the economic problem by increased commercial ties
Certainly some credit must: be given Co the person of Gorbachev. When
faced with a situation that in past circumstances would hav^- elicited harsh




with the West (codified in the Helsinki Final Act), and by
internal economic reform (through the program of perestroika)
.
Ultimately, both approaches carried political costs which the
Soviet regime proved unable to overcome: first, the exposure
of East Central European societies to greater contacts with
the West, and secondly, internal political instability which
made difficult an adequate response to the results of this
exposure. The uprisings in East Central Europe in 1989, and
throughout the Soviet Union in 1991, were a product of the
turbulence created by this political inability to solve the
Soviet economic problem.
C. CONCLUSIONS
The collapse of both the first and second security pnases
in East Central Europe was prompted by an evolving internal
weakness in the hegemonic power within a particular phase; in
each case the weakness of the hegemonic power was accelerated
by social and political changes within of East Central Europe.
In particular, the collapse of the first security phase
resulted from the inability of the Western democracies to
solve the problem of Germany, and subsequently, East Central
Europe became the arena within which the German problem was to
run its initial course. The collapse of the second security
phase resulted from the inability of the Soviet Union to solve
its economic problem, and in that case also, East Central
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Europe became the first avenue of Western penetration of the
satellite buffer system.
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VI. REBUILDING THE BUFFER, DESTROYING THE HIGHWAY
"This war is not as in the past; whoever occupies a
territory also imposes on it his own social system.
Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can
reach. It can not be otherwise." 112
"The people of Central and Eastern Europe 'resolutely
reject any ideas of gray or buffer zones. They imply a
continued division of the continent . ... Without a secure
Poland and a secure Central Europe, there is no secure and
stable Europe'." 173
The United States and its Western European allies should
exercise caution and restraint with regard to formal
integration of East Central Europe within the common security-
institutions of the West. Contained within this argument is
the assertion that a cautious approach is one in which the
states of East Central Europe are retained as a political and
geographic buffer between Western Europe and the Commonwealth
of Independent States; contained within this assertion is the
idea that a security buffer should be retained in such a way
as to reduce as much as possible those factors which would
turn it into a highway transporting a political threat into
the West at some time- in the future.
1
'Stalin, in conversation with Tito during the Second World War.
Milovan Djilas, Conversations With Stalin
,
114.
'"Address by President Lech Walesa of Poland on the Occasion of His
Visit to NATO July 3, 1991," Press Release, Republic of Poland, Brussels, in
Stephen J. Flanagan, "NATO and Central and Eastern Europe: From Liaison to
Security Partnership," Washington Quarterly, Spring 1992, 143.
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Since 1919, security foundations and specific architecture
in East Central Europe have followed a repetitive cycle of
policy behavior on behalf of the external power placed by
circumstances into a position of preponderant influence within
the region. This cycle of policy behavior contains elements
both of initial success, as well as of eventual failure.
Exposing the two contradictory elements of this repetitive
cycle, by disclosing a consistent pattern contained in five
dependent variables, has been the task of the previous two
chapters. Understanding the relationship between the current
security environment in East Central Europe and traditional
security conditions is the task of subsequent discussion.
Specifically, can one demonstrate that the foundations
which governed past security policy still exist in the post-
Cold War world of East Central Europe? And, from those
similar foundations, can one argue that traditional security
structures should emerge to govern future understandings? Is
current policy in East Central Europe embarked less on
formulating a New World Order, and engaged instead in the task
of imposing an old order on a not so new world? Is it
possible to construct policy which can emulate past successes
while at the same time avoiding past mistakes, or are the two
elements of the traditional security cycle since 1919
inseparable?
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A. IN DEFENSE OF TRADITIONAL FOUNDATIONS: COLLECTIVE SECURITY
VERSUS THE REGIONAL HEGEMON
Throughout the first two security phases in East Central
Europe, the constant governing all other security
considerations was the presence of a hegemonic power adjacent
to regional borders, and the subordination (born of
geopolitical weakness) of the states of East Central Europe to
the wishes of that more powerful neighbor. The Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) which convened at
Paris in November 1990 was the first (and most powerful)
attempt by the newly created democratic regimes in East
Central Europe to escape a traditional status as stepchild
between two warring parents, dependent on either parent (but
preferring the Western one) for security and protection. This
attempt to remove entirely the hegemon/client status quo was
believed possible within the fabric of an all-European
collective security.
Several factors contributed to the euphoria of the East
Central Europeans for the ideals and prospects of an all-
European security arrangement. The CSCE at Paris was
encouraged by American policy makers as a mechanism with which
to hasten a then just begun Soviet military withdrawal from
East Central Europe. Moscow, which had long encouraged a pan-
European security process (indeed, Soviet strategy in this
regard had been the driving force behind the original CSCE in
1975) as a way of weakening NATO and reducing American
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influence, encouraged East Central European enthusiasm at
Paris in 1990. Admittedly, this Soviet encouragement was
conducted from a slightly different policy slant; by the Paris
Conference, Soviet policy, under the guise of Gorbachev's
'Common European Home', focussed much more on keeping the




Also, there was still some surprise at the ease of the
1989 revolutions, and the depth of Soviet commitment not to
stop the revolutions by force. Both Czechoslovakia's Havel
and Hungary's Antall had some hope that the Paris Conference
was but a step in a greater process of spiritual, moral, and
political democratic union. The important analysis to take
away from the idea of pan-Europeanism espoused at Paris was
that political unity implied the idea of political equality,
the reduction of client status, and the removal of an external




The move by Soviet Russia in January 1991 to repress the
independence movements in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia,
combined with the complete inability of the all-European
security system to either deter, modify, or end Soviet actions
1 4Mikhail Gorbachev, "A Common European Home,* July 6, 1989 The Current
Digest of Che Soviet Press , Vol. 61, No. 27, 1989, 6-7, in Gale Stokes, ed.
,
From Stalinism to Pluralism , 266-267.
""Further Reportage on Paris CSCE Summit - Hungary's Antall Speaks,"
Budapest MTI, 20 Nov 90, FBIS , 23 Nov 90. and "CSRF President Havel
Addresses CSCE Summit," Prague Hospodarske Movmv, 20 Nov 90, FBIS , 26 Nov
90.
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served largely to destroy East Central European hopes at
escape from traditional security constraints. 176 In the
immediate aftermath of the Baltic repression, the East Central
European democracies embarked on a second (still ongoing)
attempt to escape the traditional security role: the campaign
for outright membership in NATO, complete with security
guarantee. East Central Europe would cease to be a buffer
between Russia and the West by becoming part of the West. 177
In a paradoxical way, membership within NATO has been
perceived by the East Central Europeans as a security
architecture which would eliminate buffer status, whereas
membership within the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) was
never perceived as anything but an affirmation of that
traditional role on behalf of Soviet power. This perceptual
contradiction is the product of three factors: the political
relationships within either alliance between member states,
the domestic political environment within member states, and
1 6 In Che case of che crackdown in che Balcics, CSCE moved to condemn
Che Soviec accion under basket one principles. The Eastern Europeans were
reminded by the Soviets of the peculiar qualities of unanimity amongst




1 As opposed to cooperating with, supported by, aided by, cheered on
by, affiliated with, or associated with the West.
"Defense Minister Interviewed On Warsaw Pact, Gulf," Budapest
Nepszabadsag, FBIS , 25 January 1991, p. 39. Drozdiak, W. , "Havel Urges NATO
to Seek Ties Wich Ease's New Democracies," The Washington Post , 22 March
1991, p. a, 18:4. Beck, E., "Hungary Votes to Join NATO Council," The Times
,
31 January 91, p.ll:b. Keifer F., "East Europeans Seek Closer Tie With
MAT'")," The Christian Science Monicor
,
21 March 1991, p.l:L. Szymandarski
Appointed co NAT'") Political Body," Warsaw Domestic Service, FBIS , 4 December
19 9 0, p . 2 7
.
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the cultural relationship between the Russian and East Central
European societies. 178 In short, the obvious satellite
client status embodied in the WTO, based on the ever present
threat of military crackdown, insured that activities in East




By way of contrast, the voluntary nature of NATO, as well
as the independent voice and relative equality of its members
produced an alliance in which all members served the interest
of the group. This rather optimistic interpretation of NATO
is not meant to deny the preponderant American position within
the alliance, or the often expressed resentment of that
178The last is a critical point, because it is central to the East
Central European self -identity . "In Central Europe, the eastern border of
the West, everyone has always been particularly sensitive to the dangers of
Russian might." The signal manifesto of this European self identity is by
Milan Kundera, "The Tragedy of Central Europe," Edmund White, Trans., The New
York Review of Books
,
April 26, 1984, 33-38, in Gale Stokes, ed. From
Stalinism to Pluralism , 217-223.
1 9The Warsaw Pact was a curious organization, only marginally dedicated
to collective defense against the West, and more intensely concentrated
against popular uprisings within the Pact itself. Established on May 14,
1955 ostensibly to counter the German membership, in NAT< > formalized nine days
earlier, and later updated in 1969, the Pact's two principal organs were the
Political Consultative Committee (PCC) and Combined Armed Forces (CAF)
headquarters. Head of the CAF was allocated on a rotating basis amongst the
Deputy Defense Ministers of the participating countries. Throughout the
history of the Pact ,' headquarters remained in Moscow. Operational reality,
of course, was somewhat different. In event of conflict, member country
forces were to be subordinated not to the CAF, but to the Soviet High
Command. Soviet High Command staffs, unlike their counterparts in NATO, had
no non-Soviet member representation. The only use of combined Pact forces,
the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, provided ample evidence of this
Soviet control, as the entire operation was run from a Soviet High Command
Headquarters Forward Command Post in Legnica, Poland. David L. Clarke, "The
Military Institutions of the Warsaw Pact," Report on Eastern Europe , December
7, 1990, 28-31. Non-Soviet Warsaw Pace Force;-; Summary , Defense Research
Reference Series, DIA, February 1989, 7-8, 15-16, 19-20. Michael Charlton,
The Eagle and the Small Birds , 13 8-139.
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position by individual alliance members, 180 but is meant
rather to imply that despite the American military position in
Europe, no single member - a Germany or a France - could be
said to serve the United States at the expense of its own
respective self-interests.
Disappointment in the collective security workings of the
CSCE, coupled with a persistent enthusiasm for membership in
NATO (with the security guarantee associated with membership)
produced in regional policy deliberations a strong desire to
escape traditional client/buffer status by casting East
Central Europe as "the eastern border of the West." 181
Unfortunately, the very strength of the local desire for
regional inclusion in the West has produced the opposite
result of that intended: the confirming of a traditional
hegemon-client relationship as a precursor to any final
regional post-Cold War security arrangement; Western political
leadership can conduct security policy sure in the knowledge
that East Central Europe desires no arrangements outside of
180France in particular has mosc often expressed discontent with the
American position within the alliance. American leadership has on the main
downplayed internal dissent. President Bush's Rome press conference was a
classic example of this inter-alliance dynamic at work: "Now, when you have
frank discussions in a group as big as NAT", are there going to be some
nuances of difference? Of course, there are differences. But I think on
this instance, France was most constructive.' "The President's News
Conference in Rome, Italy, November 8, 1991," 1605.
181Milan Kundera, "The Tragedy of Central Europe," 217. it is all very
well for Lech Walesa to reject a continued buffer status which would in his
words 'imply a continued division of the continent,' when he very readily
believes that such a division does in face exist. Walesa would have been
more honest in saying that buffer status 'implies a continue';] division of the
continent, and the exclusion, of Ease Central Europe from that side most
favorably endowed by this division.'
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those provided by the West. 18 '1 In this way, the constant
governing all other security considerations throughout the
first two security phases in East Central Europe 183 has
remained a constant at the outset of the third phase, despite
the best efforts of local regimes to escape this traditional
hegemon-client security constraint.
B. HAPHAZARD BIRTH, POLITICAL CONTEST, AND THE THREAT TO THE
WEST
Despite protestations by many observers, current threats
to Western security are not particularly unique, nor are they
particularly new, if current threats are seen in the context
of those traditionally faced by the external power placed by
circumstances into a position of preponderant influence in
East Central Europe. Corralled under the semantic umbrella of
'instability', the hazards present in the post-Soviet world
are dangerous not so much because they are aimed at Western
military structures, but because they impinge on the internal
political stability and continued harmony within the aggregate
states of the Western alliance. Put so succinctly by
President Bush at his Rome press conference, "the enemy, a
'By this it is meant that despite future political changes to include
even the most drastic authoritarianism, it is simply too fantastic to
consider the possibility of regimes in East Central Europe, willfully and
without coercion, concluding security alliances with post-Soviet Russia after
the Russian legacy of the Cold War. In this way, Western hegemony in East
Central Europe is as much a product of moral authority as of any other
fact o r
.
'The presence of a hegemonic power adjacent to regional borders, and
the subordination (born of geopolitical weakness) of the states of East













































the disasters of the
Soviet experiment
TABLE II. ANALYSIS OF THREAT BY SECURITY PHASE
monolithic, powerful Soviet Union is no longer the enemy. The
enemy is uncertainty. The enemy is unpredictability. The
friend is stability." 184 What, then, are the concrete
expressions of instability? How do those expressions form an
internal political threat to the West? Why does the political
threat to the West demand of Western policy that it consider
post-Soviet Russia cautiously, best kept behind an East
Central European buffer rather than integrated into some sort
"The President's News Conference in Rome, Italy, November 8, 1991,"
1607. In a call for establishing regional democracy, Secretary Baker again
repeated this perception of threat: "Without legitimacy, there will never be
stability. without stability, Western security will never be assured."
James A. Baker, "America and the Collapse of the Soviet Empire: What Has to
be Done, " 14 .
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of formal architecture within the West (and thus eliminating
any need for a buffer at all)?
One of the signal difficulties for Western planners in a
post-Cold War security environment is the lack of a single
issue focus - a problem extant neither in 1919 by virtue of
the juxtaposition of threat with Bolshevism, nor in 1945 by
virtue of the untrammelled authority of Stalin's particular
vision. Such clarity is not the case now, the absence of
which is used largely to dismiss the threat. A threat does
exist, however - multi-faceted and nebulous to be sure, but
real all the same - which, like those that preceded it in
guiding East Central European security conditions, is
essentially political in nature; the various strands of this
hazardous fabric can be grouped for the most part under a
single heading of responsibility
.
The collapse of the Soviet experiment produced in regions
of prior Soviet dominance military, political, economic and
social dislocations of a magnitude borderingon the fantastic.
Both magnitude and specific characteristics insure that
certain of these dislocations have a direct and continuing
impact on the political health and even the internal stability
of the West - not only in terms of collective political
identity, but also in terms of the internal workings of
component members. Accordingly, a prudent policy would limit
the fallout of the post-Soviet dislocations, while at the same
time avoiding the exhausting consequences of so great a task.
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This necessity for avoidance requires a certain detachment and
freedom of action - a willingness to be responsive to, without
being responsible for - which should come from an
understanding that many of the post-cold war dislocations can
be solved only in the long-term, and some not at all.
The first facet of the threat involves responsibility for
the disaster of Marxisc economic philosophy and the
implication of such a responsibility for Western governments.
The Russian economic collapse has produced three separate sets
of security problems for the West: the removal of East Central
Europe's chief economic supplier (particularly of oil), the
removal of East Central Europe's principle customer, and the
generation of a huge body of potential economic refugees.
Western ability to respond completely to this economic black
hole is not increased by optimism. Although much can be done;
the danger exists in the degree that Western economies will be
strained by the effort, as well as the degree that Western
populations will be angered by the strain. In this way, the
threat to the West revolves not around the post-Soviet
economic disaster per se, but around the dislocations involved
with Western efforts to reverse the economic disaster
.
18C|
!jThe black-hole potential of Eastern European and Russian regimes
concerning economic aid was discussed by Stephen E'opper of the RAND
Corporation at the conference Bevond Leninism in Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union
,
U.C. Berkeley, 15 March 1991.
Any agenda of economic aid to the former Soviet Union which would hope
to produce anything beyond stop-gap emergency relief would have to be
classified as daring bordering on reckless. The scope of the collapse, the
lack of any optimistic near-term forecast, and the intimidating prospect of
societal -level psychological retraining concerning fundamental issues of
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The military threat from Russia is slight in the near
term, but were it still strong, the extension of Western
military boundaries would do little to contain it, while the
implications of such an extension would weaken the West at its
vulnerable internal/political core. Certainly the sheer size
of the Western military problem would become formidable, and
in lieu of modern integrated host forces (an unlikely
eventuality) 18 " would involve the expensive stationing of
Western troops (including German forces) on host soil 187 .
The political costs of such a policy would be formidable in
market -mechanism and work ethic all indicate an aide program involving a lot
of money, managed by a lot of skilled people, over a long period of time,
with only modest prospects of success. Professor Jacques Sapir of the Ecole
des Hautes Etudes en Scienes Soiales, Paris has postulated two economic
scenarios. The first, a fast recovery scenario, would have the fifteen
Republics achieving 1988 levels of GNP by 1997 at Che earliest. A second,
and in his opinion, more likely scenario would have no recovery to 1988
levels of GNP prior to 2000. Lecture at NPGS, NS 4720, 3 October 1991.
The difficulties of economic recovery are adequately illustrated by the
German experiment, which has been far more costly than was anticipated.
Because recovery is tied with German domestic politics, failure to provide
recovery quickly has produced a significant amount of internal
disillusionment and dissatisfaction in both the former East and in the former-
West, factors which provide a stimulus for a future instability.
The economic refugee question is a considerable one, and one that is
already responsible for political fallout in the West. Recent attacks on
Algerian Harkis (former French Army veterans) in France (sparked by Jean Le
Pen's Action Francaise style political program), attacks on Turkish Workers
in Germany, and Polish migrant laborers in Germany illustrate the problem, as
well as the limits accrued to a Western solution. Gati, C, "Central Europe
is Scared," New York Times , 14 February 1991, p. a, 27:2. Bugajksi, J., "A
Squeeze in Ease Europe," Christian Science Monitor , 21 February 1991, p. 19:1.
Aron,- L., "the Russians, are Coming,' The Washington Post , 27 January 1991,
p . C , 1 : 1
.
abThe problems of creating a professional military force, compatible
with the West in terms of equipment and training, are difficult to overcome
in a pose-cold war time of economic collapse, social reorientation, and
fiscal restraint. Weydenthal, J., "Building a National Security System,"
Report on Eastern' Europe , 14 June 1991, pp. 12-16. "Defense Minister Comments
:oming Army Changes," Prague Television Service, FBIS , 2 November 1990,
p. 18. Clarke, D., "A Realignment of Military Forces in Eastern Europe,"
Report on Eastern Europe , 8 Ma re h i 9 9 1 , pp .41-45.
187Weitz, pp. 30-35. Eide, pp. 1-6.
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the host country alone, but at an internal/Western level, the
results could be explosive - involving fears of a Germany
resurgent in its role as security spokesman for the West 188 .
The third, and perhaps greatest, threat produced by the
collapse of the Soviet experiment revolves around the issue of
ethnic nationalism - a multi-tiered, sensitive, and extremely
dangerous challenge to Western political health and stability
operating as a set of four dominoes, each placed
progressively closer to the political heart of the West. Each
of these four dominoes is more effectively contained by the
continued use of East Central Europe as a buffer (its
1 88The renewed German problem will be discussed in a later, speculative
section concerning the collapse of the third security phase. There is a
significant debate over the effects of East Central European inclusion in a
Western Security alliance on the behavior of united Germany. Some argue that
inclusion serves to reduce German status, by effectively reducing the scope
of any independent German security policy. others (including this author)
argue that East Central European security membership would necessitate more
active Western military involvement, and that Western military involvement
(by virtue of the ongoing reduction of American presence, and the German
geographic and economic position) would translate into German military
involvement. Germany would then be in " a position to use its military
influence in East Central Europe (assuming that East Central Europe is a full
member of the West) to control East Central Europe's alliance votes, and thus
to control the Western European security agenda (much in the same way that
American strength once allowed American policy desires Co control the
European agenda)
.
German policy leadership may in fact be divorced from its unfortunate
past record,- and there is no evidence that popular German opinion would
desire such a prominent security role, but German leadership is feared by
many nonetheless. The most prominent among those that fear the Germans are
the Germans themselves, who seem to want an arrangement which would produce
a continental Germany, rather than a German continent. This fear could
create divisions in the political fabric of the West. "The German Question,"
The Economist , 12 October 1991, pp. 18-19. Yost, D., "France in the New
Europe," Foreign Affairs , vol.69, Winter 1990/91, pp. 113-115.
"A challenge rould evolve from chaos on the territory of the former
Soviet Union, from ethnic conflicts and political instability in Eastern
Europe, and from the redefinition of Germany's role. ... existing European
institutions cannot by themselves establish a balance between Germany and its
partners, even less between Germany and the former Soviet Union." Henry
Kissinger, "The Atlantic Alliance Meeds Renewal in a Changed World," 5-6.
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traditional role) , rather than as a member of the Western
system. 189
A great risk, of course, is that the disintegration of the
Russian imperium will produce a violence within former Union
borders subject to leakage, and that a Western security
guarantee would require a Western military containment
effort. 190 The problem resides both in the scope of the
violence (and thus in the level of necessary commitment), and
the choosing among combatants necessitated by commitment. 191
The second risk (or domino) concerns the challenge to post-
Soviet borders by dissatisfied former clients, again with the
potential to draw in Western resources too closely bound by
189Here the words ethnic nations and nations are used interchangeably,
using as a definition that "the essence of nations ... (is that they are) ...
the largest human grouping characterized by a myth of common ancestry. The
historical accuracy of the myth is irrelevant. ... Offshoot nations are
formed when an important segment of a nation has been geographically
separated from the parent group for a period of time sufficient for it to
develop a strong sense of separate consciousness. Members retain an
awareness that they derive from the parent stock, but they believe that the
characteristics they have in common are less significant than those that make
them unique." Conner, W., "Ethnonationalism, • in Weiner, M., and Huntington,
S., ed., Understanding Political Development , 1987, pp. 211-212.
190Some actively call for such a posture: "Moreover, if a no-man's-land
is to be avoided in Eastern Europe, NATO ought to leave no doubt that
pressures against these countries would be treated as a challenge to Western
security, whatever the formal aspect of this undertaking." Henry Kissinger,
"The Atlantic Alliance Needs Renewal in a Changed World," 7.
The most obvious scenario involves a Russian/Ukrainian conflict,
created out of some crisis involving either the armed forces, control of
nuclear weapons, borders, economic policy/conditions, or the treatment of
minority populations. The near-term prospects of such a scenario seem
unlikely. The consequences of such a conflict, however, should it (or
another like it) occur, would be tremendous.
Despite the unlikelihood of such a scenario, the possibility of regional
military conflict is one of seven scenarios proposed by the Pentagon as the
basis of post-Cold War military planning. Patrick E. Tyler, "Pentagon
Imagines Mew Enemies to Fight in Post-Cold-War Era: Plans for Hypothetical
Conflicts and Big Budgets," The Mew York Tunes
,
February 17, 1992, 1. Barton
Gellman, "Keeping the U.S. First: Pentagon Would Preclude a Rival
Superpower," The Washington Post , March 11, 1992, 1.
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security guarantees. 192 A third domino, implying much the
same dangers, involves ethnic/border disputes within Eastern
Europe - disputes which may lose their element of dormancy
under the strain of worsening conditions . 1CI3 The risk of a
quagmire-ish Western military involvement frames each of these
ethnic-national dominoes. The real risk, however is more
internal to the West, and thus more dangerous
.
194
The internal/political fallout of indiscriminate Western
involvement in post-Soviet ethnic disputes carries the risk of
both interstate and intrastate instability, with the first
creating and then in turn evolving from the circumstances of
192The two most likely scenarios involve Romanian claims in Moldava, and
Polish claims in Lithuania. Lithuanian efforts at independence repeatedly
stressed the need to return to 1919-1940 borders. Such a border excludes
roughly one-third of current Lithuanian territory from Lithuanian political
control (including the capitol of Vilnius, the Polish city of Wilno). The
Poles have not closed this border issue. Bourne, E., "Central European
Reformers Slip into Historic Feuds," The Christian Science Monitor , 1 May
1991, p. 6:4.
At present, national rivalry and irredentist claims among Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary demand a lower portion of public passion.
Unfortunately, the rivalries are no less real, each a malevolent presence
submerged beneath greater concerns. Historically, Poland has always claimed
the Czech industrial region of Teschen on the Polish-Silesian border.
Czechoslovakia has been concerned about the Slovak minority in Hungary.
Hungary claims territory in Slovakia, Romania (Transylvania), and Yugoslavia
(Vojvodina and parts of Croatia) . At various times, Walesa and Havel have
maintained a running personal feud, Czechoslovakia and Hungary have engaged
in sharp diplomatic exchanges over the failure of joint-border hydroelectric
projects, and Hungary has pursued an arms, export policy designed to
destabilize Yugoslavia. Bourne, p. 6:4. Rothschild, pp. 8-9. Kusin, v.,
"Security Concerns in Eastern Europe," Report on Eastern Europe , 8 March
1991, p. 26. Boyes, R., "Havel-Walesa Cold War Shows Hint of a Thaw," The
Times , 19 February 1991, p. 8b.
1<4The above stated scenarios are related independent of an analysis of
probability. In the current context, their potential is low. But in rapidly
worsening conditions, they become much more likely. Reference to the
immediate post-Versailles activity (specifically the Polish attack on Russia,
and the joint Romanian/Hungarian war) indicate the degree that regimes, it
given will go to insure a measure of legitimacy, if given no other entry into
greater popular support.
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the second. Ethnic dispute requires of Western members a
course of action and an evaluation of right and wrong among
the participants in the dispute. This evaluation (itself a
product of internal ethnic dynamic and external mistrust for
fellow member intentions) is by no means unanimous within the
West, nor is it likely to be in the future. 195 The
subsequent course of action would in turn feed an intrastate
instability, the potential of which was the source of the
original evaluative disagreement
.
l9b The result could be the
19 The Yugoslavia issue is a good example of Che dilemma and its
alliance fallout. Initially the Germans supported recognition of Croatia and
Slovenia. The French, fearing a Teutonic Bloc across Central Europe, and
also struggling with their own internal Basque separatist movement, supported
a united Serbia (as did Spain, Britain, and Italy, for similar reasons).
"Not 1914, but not 1991 either," The Economist , 10 August 1991, p. 37.
19b imagine the consequences that German support for Croatia (a move
feared by Great Britain because of her own ethnic vulnerabilities), and then
subsequent Croatian support for Ulster separatism, would have on the
separatist movement (because of the hope offered by Balkan success), British
internal politics (because of the need for greater military effort in
Northern Ireland) , and on British relations with Germany (because Germany
started it all by recognizing Croatia).
It is not necessary that support for Western ethnic populations be
material; heightened awareness, precedent, and moral parallels can have a
tremendous impact on popular movements. What would be the Western response
to outside intervention in internal ethnic disputes, once the precedent :f
such interventions has been established?
An interesting case in point is Scotland. Feelings of
disenf ranchisement (occurring over thirteen years of Conservative rule in
which only nine out of seventy-two Scottish Members of Parliament have been
conservative), a decline in traditional industries, and a deep sense of place
have produced tiie following numbers: one in five Scots favors the status quo,
seven out of ten "no longer consider themselves British, and eight out of ten
want constitutional change." (numbers compiled by David McRone of Edinburgh
University). James Kellas of Glasgow University asks the question clearly:
"if Slovenia and Croatia can be accepted as independent states, why not
Scotland?" Knight, R., "The Ghost of Robert Bruce Stirs Again," U . s . News
and World Report , 24 February 1992, p. 44-45.
What is implied here is not the likelyhood that the individual
constituents of the West once again will go to war with each other over East
Central Europe, but that East Central Europe could be the locus anti-
integrat ionist sentiment within Western Europe, could in fact be a cause of
instability so feared by President Bush.
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translation of these internal ethnic issues into external
inter-member mistrust
.
The retention by the West of a non-entangling security
relationship with Eastern Europe, of the retention of a
traditional buffer status, would insure that Western
involvement in the ethnic fallout of post-Soviet Russia
remained a product of choice rather than obligation, that the
scope of the threat could be managed rather than reacted to
(although never altogether eliminated) , and that difficult
choices on issues without near-term solutions could be delayed
until made consistent with a means of effective action.
The threat emanating from post-Soviet economic, military,
and social dislocations is multi-faceted, tenuous, and very
real, and is united by a single dangerous idea: Western
responsibility for the solutions to those dislocations. The
dangers of overextension and internal/political instability,
facilitated by the too close a union of East Central Europe
and the West, can be best mitigated by a retention on the part
of Eastern Europe of traditional roles.
C. GRAND STRATEGY: APPEARANCE INCONSISTENT WITH REALITY
If it is true that the establishment of Western hegemony
in East Central Europe and the concurrent creation by post-
Soviet dislocations of an internal, political threat to this
new Western hegemon are but the first steps in a historically-
grounded repetitive policy cycle, then the next logical step
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in this cyclical progression would seem to be the
establishment in East Central Europe of a political buffer
shielding • Western societies from the worst effects of the
internal political threat. The curious thing is that a de
facto plan (discerned largely through the pattern of military,
economic, and political activity) does seem to exist
concerning the role of East Central Europe within a Western-
dominated, post-Cold War security context, and does in fact
seem to constrain East Central Europe within a traditional
buffer status aimed at shielding Western societies from the
threat from the East (in this instance, post-Soviet
dislocations translated and exacerbated by the East Central
European political dynamic) . In this way, modern Western
policy makers (perhaps unintentionally) are attempting to use
East Central Europe as Stalin used it before them, and as
Wilson used it before him.
This view is by no means obvious when compared to the
public pronouncements of Western leadership - pronouncements
which declare all of the euphoric idealism found in those of
the East Central Europeans themselves at Paris in 1990.
Statements such as that made by Secretary of Defense Cheney
that, "our ultimate goal (is) a united, free, and peaceful
Europe, " 197 bode ill for either the maintenance of East
"Statement of Dick Cheney, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Meeting of
Defense Ministers with Cooperation Partners, April ., 19 c?2, MAT
Headquarters, Brussels."
131
Central Europe as a buffer, or for traditional fears of a
threat from the East. The codification of this rhetoric in
the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)
,
proposed at the
Rome Summit in November 1991 and brought into existence one
month later at Brussels, further seems to imply that
continental divisions and traditional roles are a thing of the
past. 198
Far .from ending traditional divisions in Europe, however,
organizations such as NACC and the CSCE provide a security
umbrella diluted by uncommon goals and mutually exclusive
histories, and devoid of any concrete measures beyond a
liaison function. By extending common security architecture
to fifty-four countries ranging from 'Vladivostok west to
Vancouver, ' current codifications of security rhetoric provide
within a pan-European system the opportunity to pursue
national and regional goals. As Henry Kissinger has so
pointedly explained the dilemma: "if everybody is allied with
everybody in that vast area, will anyone have a special
obligation to anyone?" 149 This lack of obligation is
8
"In Che new era of European relations where Che confrontation and
division of pasc decades have been replaced by dialogue, partnership and
cooperation, we are determined to work towards a new, lasting order of peace
in Europe. . . . The consolidation and preservation throughout the continent of
democratic societies and their freedom from any form of coercion or
intimidation therefore concern us all." Statement of the Foreign Ministers
of che North Atlantic Alliance, "North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement
on Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation, 20th December 1991," Press
rommunique M-NACC-lOl) 111, (Rev
,
MAT<> Press Service, 1.
"Henry Kissinger, "The Atlantic Alliance Needs Renewal in a Change';!
World, " 7.
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reflected in the unwillingness of the West to extend direct
membership into working security bodies, and the desire on the
part of the East Central Europeans for just such a concrete
obligation . J "°
This contradiction between the promises of pan-European
security organizations and the abilities of their smaller more
established Western counterparts, has prompted calls on the
part of some Western analysts for a more rapid evolution from
a relationship with East Central Europe characterized by
liaison functions, to one involving mutual membership. 201
Towards these calls, the response of Western leadership has
been one of resounding caution. 202 Eventual membership is
200Western reluctance was tempered, of course, by the soothing voice of
diplomatic compromise. At a moral/spiritual level, speeches were made
reaffirming the common democratic culture and destiny of Eastern Europe and
the West, specifically in remarks made by Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy Paul Wolfowitz ac the Conference on "The Future of European Security"
Prague Czechoslovakia, 25 April 1991, News Release, Office of Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
,
and reported as "Delegates on European
security," Prague CTK, 25 Apr 91, FBIS , 29 April 1991. Political linkage has
grown quite large, and includes Eastern European delegates on all the major
organizational committees (although as observers, rather than voting
members), including the Atlantic Council, Council of Europe, and Economic
Community. Weitz, R., "NATO and the New Eastern Europe," Report on Eastern
Europe , 24 May 1991, pp. 30-35. Eide, V., "NATO in a Changing World," The
RUSI Journal , Spring 1990, pp. 1-6. Keifer, F., "NATO recasts its Role in
Europe," The Christian Science Monitor , 10 June 1991, p. 3:2. Goshko, J.,
"NATO Pledges Increased Cooperation with Countries of Eastern Europe," The
Washington Post , 7 June 1991, p. a, 17:1.
All of these links, and subsequent ones made at Maastricht and Rome,
have fallen short of the type of integration and security guarantee desired
by the Eastern Europeans. The reasons for this Western reluctance revolve
around Western perceptions of the threat, perceptions that will be
subsequently be examined.
^ 01 For a persuasive argument for this position, see Stephen J. Flanagan,
""NATO and Central and Eastern Europe: From Liaison to Security Partnership."
(
^When asked about granting eventual full membership to the East
Central Europeans, President Bush responded carefully: "I think it's a little
premature on that. And let's get going now on this Council. Let'.; :onsult
with them. Let's make them know that we have keen interest in their security
and m'their economic will-being. but I think it's premature to go beyond
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not discounted, but rather passed off to a distant future
defined by the fulfillment of a vague set of conditions.
Given the fear expressed by Western leadership of instability
within Europe, the potential for instability contained in
post-Soviet Russia, and the reluctance to extend security
guarantees east of NATO's traditional borders, 203 one can
reasonably conclude that, despite either rhetoric or
intentions, East Central Europe is at present confined by
Western policy as a buffer against an uncertain future.
Considering the concrete economic, military, and political
expressions of instability currently confronting the West, as
well as the potential for elements within East Central Europe
to accelerate those expressions, Western caution is both
prudent and desirable, and reflects an ongoing cycle of policy
behavior governing security development in East Central
Europe
.
All of these activities indicate a design for East Central
Europe based on the implicit analysis of post-Soviet
dislocations as principally an internal domestic threat,
dangerous because of its potential for Western overextension
and exhaustion. This threat is best contained behind a series
of buffer states in East Central Europe, behind a new cordon
sanitaire. The new cordon sanitaire is made possible by a
char." " President's News Conference In Pome, Italy, November 8, 1991," 1607
""excluding of course the inclusion of former East German territory.
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combination of detached involvement with the newly democratic
regimes - by selective and non-entangling economic, political,
military, and social affiliation and assistance. This
detached involvement, which reinforces the status of Eastern
states as being of Europe - without allowing them actually to
be in Europe - is a prudent answer directed at a fundamental
question: "how to convince the Eastern Europeans that they are
part of the same community of nations, without gravely
impairing the progress towards economic and political
integration achieved in the West . " Z0A
"" Eyal, J., "Eastern Europe: The Process of De-Colonization, " RUSI and
BRA^SEY'S Defence Yearbook 1991, p . j 6 .
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VI. CONCLUSION
"On each count, a question must now be raised. Will
German unity undo the political balance in Western Europe?
Can the break-up of a vast eastern empire be handled
peacefully? Will the West, as a cohesive group of like-
minded nations, survive the loss of its common enemy? " 20S
Optimism about the prospects of the third security phase
evolves from the belief that in the first two phases, East
Central Europe effectively performed its security function,
that the current relationship between the threat and the
hegemonic power is similar to the two such relationships which
preceded, and that the current, implicit plan responds (as did
those before it) to the threat /hegemon relationship.
Furthermore, the exacerbating function of East Central Europe
vis a vis the threat is reduced as much as is possible, and
the process of internal moral collapse, so evident in the
eventual failure of the first two phases, is, if not retarded
by, then at least not accelerated by the traditional East
Central European role.
When the collapse comes, however, precedent would indicate
(and analysis of the current threat would tend to confirm)
that the source will be an internal moral failing - an
inability to solve a fundamental political, economic, or
'"'"Schools Brief: Securing Europe's Peace," The Economist , February 15
1392, 60.
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social problem - which will make the West vulnerable to what
remains of the post-Soviet dislocations. Accordingly, two
avenues serve to make the collapse less likely: expenditure of
effort conducted to insure the rapid reduction of the post-
Soviet dislocations, and conservation of effort conducted to
reduce the possibilities of internal failure. The role of
East Central Europe in a Western-dominated, post-cold war
security environment, if consistent with the threat and
traditional in action, facilitates greatly the positive
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